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INTRODUCTION
The debate about financial advice in the United States has taken a
wrong turn. Instead of focusing on particular practices and the potential
that these practices raise for conflicts of interest between advisers and their
clients, the debate has focused recently on whether brokers,1 advisers to
municipal and state issuers,2 and advisers to employee benefit plans
regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”)3
should be held to a fiduciary duty standard. A fiduciary standard implies,
in the words of Justice Cardozo, that “[a] trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”4
The thought is that brokers and ERISA advisers will be more attentive to
their clients’ needs if such a fiduciary standard applies. Certainly, this is
the basis upon which the Department of Labor is currently considering
rules that apply fiduciary standards to ERISA advisers.5
This Article argues that this reliance on fiduciary duties is misplaced.
In part, this is because most fiduciary duties that arise with respect to
financial advice can be modified by an agreement between the fiduciary
and the beneficiary. To be sure, there are procedural limits to ensure that a
beneficiary has both the capacity and the information necessary to enter
into a particular arrangement. But fiduciary duties turn out to be just a
more punctilious version of contract law, with a few exceptions. This
general contractual principle applies to both state fiduciary duties and to
1. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 703 (2010) (describing broker and adviser duties as being
“fiercely debated”).
2. See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., MSRB Notice 2011-48, MSRB Files Municipal
Adviser Fiduciary Duty Rule and Interpretive Notice, (Aug. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/Regulatory-Notices/2011/2011-48.aspx
(detailing the proposed duties of loyalty and care under MSRB rule G-36).
3. Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, News Release: US Labor Department’s
EBSA to Re-Propose Rule on Definition of a Fiduciary, (Sept. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/2011/11-1382-NAT.html.
4. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
5. See Opportunities for Savings: Removing Obstacles for Small Business: Hearing
Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 112th Cong. 4 (2012) (statement of Phyllis Borzi,
Assistant Sec’y, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Dep’t of Labor) (noting that “Our new rule
[that revises the definition of ‘fiduciary’] will hold advisers responsible so that small
employers can have confidence in the investment advice they receive and won’t be left
holding the responsibility for losses that occur when . . . they’ve dutifully followed . . .
[imprudent] investment advice . . .”).
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federal fiduciary duties that arise under statutes such as the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (the “IAA”), the Investment Company Act of 1940
(the “ICA”), and ERISA.
Relying on fiduciary duties in connection with financial advice is also
misplaced because, even where these duties exist, they are cabined by
procedural restrictions that make them, as a practical matter, unavailable to
beneficiaries. This is most evident in the IAA. Under this Act, the
Supreme Court has held that advisers have a fiduciary duty to their clients,
but has restricted the reach of this duty by also holding that clients do not
have a private cause of action unless they qualify under section 215.6 This
has left enforcement of fiduciary duties under the IAA to the Securities
Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) and state security regulators. Although
the Supreme Court has not spoken about this issue in the context of the
ICA, lower court case law overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that,
except under sections 30(h) and 36(b), no private causes of action exist
under the ICA.7
In theory, the SEC could be a powerful advocate for fiduciary duties.
In practice, though, the SEC is so resource poor that it has done a
remarkably poor job in recent years in finding basic fraud among
investment advisers, much less in enforcing fiduciary duties.8 The SEC is
so resource constrained that it examines the typical investment adviser once
every eleven years.9 The SEC’s failures led Congress, in section 914 of the
Dodd-Frank Act, to direct the SEC to study the structure of investment
adviser regulation10.
In a political climate where Congress is very unlikely to give the SEC
significant additional funding,11 the debate has become whether a self6. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17, 19–20 (1979)
(noting the existence of federal fiduciary standards and holding that the only private cause
of action is under § 215 to void the investment advisor contract).
7. See, e.g., Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J., 283 F.3d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“Congress’s explicit provision of a private right of action to enforce. . . [§36(b) of the ICA]
suggests that omission of an explicit private right to enforce other sections was
intentional.”).
8. See infra notes 272-83 and accompanying text.
9. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKERDEALERS 14, A-4, A-5 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/
913studyfinal.pdf (finding that an increase in the number of investment advisers and a
decrease in OCIE staff dedicated to examining these advisers has resulted in advisers only
being examined every eleven years) [hereinafter 2011 SEC Study on Investment Advisers &
Broker-Dealers].
10. Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 914(a), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)
11. Mark Schoeff Jr., SEC Must Get Smart with Exams, Be More Efficient,
INVESTMENTNEWS, (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120313/
blog07/120319966 (reporting that “as Washington obsesses about the budget deficit . . . the
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regulatory organization for registered investment advisers should be
created.12 Such an organization would be self-funding and not subject to
the severe resource restraints of the SEC. This Article does not examine
this debate or take a position on what constitutes the proper method of
resolving the regulatory problems. Rather, the purpose of this Article is to
note that there are material problems in relying on the SEC, as currently
structured, in enforcing investment advisers’ fiduciary duties.
This Article looks at both state law and federal securities laws to see
what fiduciary duties mean in the context of financial advice. In particular,
it looks closely at New York law and the IAA. It concludes that, with the
exception of a few substantive restrictions found in the IAA, which have
corollaries in the ICA and ERISA, fiduciary principles do not interfere with
the freedom of beneficiaries and fiduciaries in creating contractual
arrangements defining the nature of these principles. Certainly this
freedom is subject to procedural safeguards that are more stringent than
those for normal contracts but, once these procedures are followed, and
assuming that the beneficiary is capable of giving informed consent, the
advisory contract can have almost any term.13
This Article examines only one part of financial advice—advice with
respect to securities. Financial advice covers a range of asset classes that
are not securities unless the investment in the assets is indirect. Thus, this
Article does not discuss investments in such asset classes as real estate,
commodities, or collectibles. This Article concludes that the best way to
approach these conflicts is not to focus on fiduciary duties and disclosure.
Rather, the more successful approach would be to ban certain conflicts of
interest. Further, this conclusion would not be materially changed if
financial advice about assets other than securities were discussed. But it is
important to acknowledge this limitation so as not to expect a broader
discussion. In addition, going forward, this Article will use the phrase
“investment advice” rather than “financial advice.”

agency never gets as much money as it says it needs”).
12. Suzanne Barlyn, COMPLY-FINRA Reignites Efforts to Oversee Investment
Advisers, REUTERS, Nov. 21, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/21/
finra-advisers-comply-idUSL1E8MK60H20121121 (observing that FINRA is advocating a
self-regulatory organization for investment advisers, while “[i]nvestment advisers are
vehemently opposed….”).
13. See Seth T. Taube, et al., The Price of Managing Money: The Applicability and
Scope of Investment Adviser Regulation, N.J. LAWYER MAGAZINE, Dec. 2000, at 40 (“There
are few substantive restrictions on advisory contracts under the [IAA].”).
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THE DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS UNDER STATE LAW

The Restatements (Third) of Agency14 and Trusts give a great deal of
contractual flexibility to fiduciaries and beneficiaries in fashioning their
relationships. An agent has particular flexibility. Sections 8.01 to 8.05 of
the Restatement (Third) of Agency set out the various default legal
restrictions on the agency relationship. The touchstone of an agent’s
fiduciary duty is the duty of loyalty, meaning that the agent must act for the
principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the relationship.15 An
agent must not accept material benefits from third parties for actions taken
related to the agency, nor may the agent act as or on behalf of an adversary
or prepare to compete with the principal.16 Finally, an agent may not use
property or confidential information for any purpose except for the
principal’s benefit.17
Section 8.06 allows an agent to obtain its principal’s consent to
conduct by the agent that would otherwise be a breach of duty under one of
sections 8.01 to 8.05.18 But, the agent is subject to various procedural
restrictions in obtaining an effective consent from its principal. The agent
must have “(i) act[ed] in good faith, (ii) disclose[d] all material facts that
the agent knows, has reason to know, or should know would reasonably
affect the principal’s judgment . . . and (iii) otherwise deal[t] fairly with the
principal.”19 The consent also may not extend beyond “either a specific act
or transaction, or acts or transactions of a specified type that could
reasonably be expected to occur in the ordinary course of the agency
relationship.”20 Contained within Comment b is the important qualification
that:
an agreement that contains general or broad language purporting
to release an agent in advance from the agent’s general fiduciary
obligation to the principal is not likely to be enforceable. This is
because a broadly sweeping release of an agent’s fiduciary duty
may not reflect an adequately informed judgment on the part of

14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person
(an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”).
15. Id. §8.01.
16. Id. §§ 8.02–04.
17. Id. § 8.05.
18. See id. §8.06, reporter’s note (a) (explaining that the Restatement (Second) of
Agency contained similar provisions allowing most duties owed by an agent to a principal to
be qualified by consent of the principal.).
19. Id. § 8.06(1)(a).
20. Id. § 8.06(1)(b).
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the principal; if effective, the release would expose the principal
to the risk that the agent will exploit the agent’s position in ways
not foreseeable by the principal at the time the principal agreed to
the release.21
The concept contained in Comment b finds its counterpart in the
SEC’s position on hedge clauses under the IAA, which are discussed in
Part V.C.2. of this Article.
Although trust law contemplates a three-party arrangement with a
settlor, a trustee, and a beneficiary, unlike the two-party arrangement of an
investment adviser and advisee, trust law affords a great deal of latitude to
the parties in crafting their relationship. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts
contains similar provisions with respect to varying the default duties of
trustees, as does the Restatement (Third) of Agency with respect to agents.
Although there is language in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts that
indicates that a settlor may be limited in the extent to which she can waive
fiduciary duties owed by a trustee,22 there is no such limitation on what a
beneficiary may do in consenting to a “breach of trust,” excepting
procedural limitations on this consent. The beneficiary must have “the
capacity to” consent, must be aware of her “rights and of all material facts
and implications that the trustee knew or should have known relating to the
matter,” and must have made the decision free of any “induce[ment] by
improper conduct of the trustee.”23 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts
contains a specific section covering exculpatory and no-contest clauses in
the trust instrument. Section 96 allows such clauses so long as they were
not obtained by the trustee “as a result of the trustee’s abuse of a fiduciary
or confidential relationship” and do not
purport[] to relieve the trustee (a) of liability for a breach of trust
committed in bad faith or with indifference to the fiduciary duties
of the trustee, the terms or purposes of the trust, or the interests of
the beneficiaries, or (b) of accountability for profits derived from

21. Id. § 8.06 cmt. b.
22. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. c (2003) (“It is contrary to
sound policy, and a contradiction in terms, to permit the settlor to relieve a ‘trustee’ of all
accountability .”); id. § 77 cmt. d (2003) (“[T]rust terms may not altogether dispense with
the fundamental requirement that trustees not behave recklessly but act in good faith, with
some suitable degree of care, and in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of the
trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.”); id. § 86 cmt. b (2003) (“A trustee’s duties, like
trustee powers, may be modified by the terms of the trust, but the duties of trusteeship are
subject to certain minimum standards that are fundamental to the trust relationship and
normally essential to it.”); id. § 87 cmt. d (2003) (“It is contrary to sound policy, and a
contradiction in terms, to permit the settlor to relieve a trustee of all accountability.”)
(emphasis in original).
23. Id. § 97.
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a breach of trust.24
State case law is in accord with the Restatements. In New York, for
example, Ridgely v. Keene held that an investment adviser was in a
“relation[ship] . . . of confidence and trust” with his clients when “[h]e
expected them to act upon his advice in the purchase and sale of stock.”25
The investment adviser in Ridgely published “circular letters” that were
sent to approximately 1,000 subscribers.26 The investment adviser agreed
with a group of stockbrokers that he would tout Southern Pacific shares,
and, in return, the stockbrokers agreed to make a payment to the adviser.27
Although the investment adviser’s clients purchased over 100,000 shares,
the stockbrokers evidently refused to honor their side of the agreement to
pay the investment adviser.28 The investment adviser sued the stockbrokers
and the Appellate Division refused to enforce the contract, holding that it
was “illegal and contrary to good morals.”29
The investment adviser had represented to its clients that it had no
connection to any stockbrokers. The Appellate Division, however, held
that, “even had there been no express representations made by him, there
would have been an implied obligation on his part not to receive pay from
third parties for advising [his clients] in a particular way.”30 In addition,
the court held that the investment adviser’s state of mind was not relevant
because “his belief in the soundness of his advice is wholly immaterial.”31
The Appellate Division ended with sweeping language that might lead
one to expect that New York does not allow the beneficiary of a fiduciary
duty to consent to any variation in its terms: “The law takes into account
human frailty, and absolutely forbids the assumption of conflicting
obligations and duties . . . .”32 This conclusion, however, is belied by later
New York case law that makes clear that an informed beneficiary may
agree to variations in the default fiduciary rules. For example, in Cholot v.
Strohm, the Appellate Division held that a broker acting for the sellers of
shares who received compensation from the buyer of the shares did not
violate section 439 of the Penal Law (now sections 180.00 to 180.05)33
24. Id. § 96(1).
25. Ridgely v. Keene, 134 A.D. 647, 649 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909).
26. Id. at 648.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 648.
29. Id. at 650.
30. Id. at 649.
31. Id.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Commercial bribing in the second degree is “confer[ring], or offer[ing] or
agree[ing] to confer any benefit upon any employee, agent or fiduciary without the consent
of the latter’s employer or principal, with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his
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because he “told . . . the owners of the . . . shares . . . what compensation he
was to receive from” the buyer of the shares.34 In the court’s view, the
sellers “knew that [the buyer] was compensating [the broker] for his
services.”35
There has been debate among legal academics on the extent to which
fiduciary law actually functions as contract law or as tort law. On one side
stands Professor Tamar Frankel, the most prominent academic in the study
of investment companies and investment advisers.36 She points out, for
example, that the duties of disclosure under fiduciary law and contract law
employer’s or principal’s affairs.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.00 (McKinney 2010).
Commercial bribing in the first degree is the same as the second degree, but requires that the
benefit to the agent “exceed[] one thousand dollars and cause[] economic harm to the
employer or principal in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars.” Id. at § 180.03.
Commercial bribe receiving in the second degree occurs when a fiduciary “solicits, accepts
or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding
that such benefit will influence his conduct in relation to his employer’s or principal’s
affairs.” Id. at § 180.05. Commercial bribe receiving in the first degree is the same as the
second degree, but requires that the “value of the benefit solicited, accepted or agreed to be
accepted exceeds one thousand dollars and causes economic harm to the employer or
principal in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars.” Id. at § 180.08.
34. Cholot v. Strohm, 256 N.Y.S. 647, 653 (App. Div. 1932).
35. Id.; accord United States v. Grace Evangelical Church of S. Providence Ridge, 132
F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1942); Schiff v. Kirby, 194 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (holding
similarly). Although Grace Evangelical Church of South Providence Ridge is not a case
under New York law, it is particularly interesting as it provides a clear example of why a
fiduciary should not be allowed to benefit from payments from a third party even if the
beneficiary agrees to this arrangement. The U.S. Department of War had hired a Mr.
Herman to acquire land for various projects such as an ordinance factory. 132 F.2d at 461.
As part of the option contracts that Mr. Herman presented to landowners, the landowner
agreed to pay Mr. Herman a 5% commission on the sales price to the U.S. if the U.S.
exercised its purchase option. Id. The majority of the court had no problem in rejecting the
U.S.’s argument that this contract was against public policy “because it appears therefrom
that the agent of the Government was to receive a commission from the vendor.” Id. As the
majority pointed out, “[i]t is obvious that the Government was fully aware of this provision;
that it was fully advised and had apparently approved a system whereby it permitted its
agent to procure options providing for payment of his commission by the vendors.” Id. The
dissenting judge would have upheld the district court in denying enforcement of the option
contract on the grounds that it was against public policy. The dissenting judge opined that:
“[s]ound reason and common sense, alike, condemn this contract as violative of
sound public policy. Instead of protecting the public (the Government and the
taxpayers), it furnished incentive for raids on the Treasury. Herman was
financially benefited by higher, not lower, purchase prices. Under the
circumstances, the vendor was, of course, willing to pay a commission to the
buyer’s representative for both were interested in boosting the price. But who
was there to protect the U.S. Government?”
Id. at 463 (Evans, J., dissenting).
36. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (Oxford University Press 2007) (providing a
primer on fiduciary law and its development).
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are very different.37
A fiduciary must provide an entrustor with relevant information,
including information about conflicts of interest, even if the
entrustor does not ask for it. A fiduciary must account for its
actions. Further, it is doubtful whether an entrustor can
effectively waive the right to truthful information. A contract
party need not offer information unless the other party asks for it
or unless it is required by the contract terms or specific law to do
so.38
On the other side, commentators such as Professor Langbein,39 Judge
Easterbrook, and Professor Fischel40 have made strong arguments that
fiduciary law functions as a set of default rules that are subject to
negotiation between the parties. “[V]irtually all trust law is default law—
rules that the parties can reject. The rules of trust law apply only when the
trust instrument does not supply contrary terms.”41
This Article does not take a position on this debate, but makes a more
limited point. Fiduciary duties are not inviolable. Rather, they are subject
to being negotiated between the fiduciary and the beneficiary. Certainly,
the beneficiary receives the benefit of a process that is meant to ensure she
has full disclosure upon which to base her decisions. And there may even
be certain limits to what the beneficiary can agree to, as pointed out by
Professor Frankel.42 But within these parameters, the relationship between
a fiduciary and a beneficiary may be defined by agreement between the two
parties.
The fact that fiduciary duties function as defaults does not mean that
they are necessarily irrelevant. It might be the case, for example, that the
process of getting a beneficiary’s consent to a conflict of interest means
that some investment advisers never seek consent from their advisees for
certain conflicts. An investment adviser might be afraid that its advisees, if
37. Id. at 235–36.
38. Id.
39. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625 (1995).
40. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 425 (1993).
41. Langbein, supra note 39, at 650.
“Another fundamentally contractarian
reinforcement for the conventional duties of loyalty and prudence is the rule that the
beneficiary may consent to trustee behavior that would otherwise breach these duties.” Id.
at 660. For a similar analysis in the context of corporate law, see Henry L. Butler & Larry
E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990).
42. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1212
(1995) (noting that there beneficiaries (or entrustors) “may only waive fiduciary duties
owed to them if they follow a two-step procedure.”).
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asked to consent to a particularly egregious conflict, might leave the
investment adviser for another investment adviser that does not seek such
consent. This is certainly the theory behind many of the federal securities
laws. As expressed in the famous words of Louis Brandeis: “Publicity is
justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman.”43 As Brandeis understood the effects of disclosure, “real”
disclosure would lead underwriters to stop charging excessive commissions
on securities offerings, presuming that potential buyers would go on
“strike” against such commissions.44
This market-based discipline, however, has been challenged by work
in behavioral economics that, in turn, has been applied to disclosure issues
by legal academics. A series of cognitive biases have been identified that
can influence investors. One leading article in the area of securities
regulation has identified the relevant biases as including “the hindsight
bias, the (flawed) reliance on heuristics (including the availability
heuristic), the presence of overconfidence and overoptimism, the
endowment effect (and other framing related biases), and the confirmation
bias.”45
The article goes on to state that “[f]rom a behavioral
perspective . . . disclosure risks confusing investors already suffering from
bounded rationality, availability, and hindsight.”46
Beyond the general concerns with effectiveness of disclosure that have
been identified in the literature on cognitive biases and securities
regulation, concerns about the effectiveness of disclosure as a remedy for
conflicts of interest have been raised by one group of researchers.47 This
43. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
44. Id. at 101–02.
45. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 7–9 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
46. Id. at 60. For a number of reasons, Professors Choi and Pritchard themselves are
not proponents of applying behavioral insights to securities regulation. They argue that
some cognitive biases offset each other and that the regulators who make up the SEC are
subject to their own cognitive biases. Id. at 16, 20–36. They also point out that “[d]espite
efforts at categorization, no underlying theory behind why we operate under biases has
emerged. Instead of a theory, behavioral economics relies on a hodgepodge of evidence
showing the effectiveness of human decisionmaking in various circumstances (often in a
controlled, laboratory setting).” Id. at 10. In the view of Professors Choi and Pritchard, the
lack of a theory means that it is impossible to know what regulatory interventions would be
effective in dealing with cognitive biases in investors. Id. at 11.
47. Professors Daylian Cain (the School of Management, Yale University), George
Lowenstein (the Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University),
Sunita Shah (the Fuqua School of Business), and Don Moore (Tepper School of Business,
Carnegie Mellon University) have cooperated in a shifting group on a series of experiments
and papers reporting on these experiments. See Daylian M. Cain et al., When Sunlight Fails
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research has produced a provocative body of work arguing that not only
may disclosure of conflicts of interest provide no additional protection to
beneficiaries, but it may actively encourage both beneficiaries and advisers
to ignore the conflicts.48 In addition, this research has found beneficiaries
to be incapable of accurately discounting the advice they receive from
conflicted advisers.49
This research was based on a series of experiments where the
beneficiaries (called “estimators” in the research) were asked to estimate
various values of houses for sale, for example, and were advised on
appropriate estimates.50 The researchers created two situations, one in
which advisers would benefit from high estimates (“conflicted”), and one
in which advisers would not benefit (“non-conflicted”).51 In addition, some
advisers told their estimators that they were giving conflicted advice, while
other estimators were not told about the conflict.52
This research was based on the assumption that “whether disclosure
hurts or helps the advisee depends on the net impact of disclosure on two
competing effects: (1) bias in the advisor’s suggestion and (2) discounting
by the advisee.”53 Some advisers were motivated by disclosure of their
conflicts of interest “to exaggerate their advice further; however, others are
likely to rein in their advice, instead.”54 The reason that a conflicted
adviser would exaggerate is obvious: the adviser benefits from an advisee
overestimating. A conflicted adviser would be tempted to exaggerate even
more if the conflict is disclosed out of concern that the advisee will
discount conflicted advice. But another adviser “might attempt to
counteract the increased mistrust that disclosure brings by reigning in
advice so that it looks realistic (i.e., so that the advice is not beyond the
plausible max).”55
The researchers located the tendency of advisers to exaggerate in what
they termed “moral licensing.”56 A series of psychological mechanisms all
provide cover for providing conflicted advice. Surprisingly, when there is
no disclosure of a conflict, advisers will forego “giv[ing] maximally biased

to Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interests, 37 J.
CONSUMER RES. 836, 837 (2011) (discussing prior research).
48. Id. at 849-50.
49. Id. at 850-51.
50. Id. at 842.
51. Id. at 843.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 838.
54. Id. at 841.
55. Id. at 839.
56. Id. at 841.
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advice,”57 in part because of the adviser’s “desire to behave as she thinks
the receiver expects her to behave.”58 But disclosure reduces the moral
restraint that advisers feel in advising advisees.59
The net effect of this academic work on disclosure under the federal
securities law, and disclosure of conflicts of interest in particular, is that we
should be skeptical of the effectiveness of disclosure as a remedy for
conflicts of interest, especially when we are considering financial advice to
small investors. This is the lesson that has been drawn, for example, in
Australia from its Future of Financial Advice initiative and in the United
Kingdom from its Retail Distribution Review initiative.60 In deciding to
restrict certain compensation arrangements that compensate investment
advisers for selling certain products, both countries have focused on the
conflicts such compensation arrangements can create between the selfinterest of the investment advisers and the best interests of their clients.61
And, in both countries, the regulatory authorities have rejected disclosure
as the sole or primary remedy.62
In Australia, the Australian Securities & Investments Commission (the
“ASIC”) has issued a detailed report on financial literacy among investors,
discussing many of the cognitive biases identified by behavioral
economics.63 In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority (the
“FSA”), which recently has been split into two separate regulatory
authorities, commissioned a report by several academics that discussed
behavioral economics in detail.64
The Australian report called for more research in the area, especially

57. Id. at 839.
58. Jason Dana, Daylian M. Cain & Robyn M. Dawes, What You Don’t Know Won’t
Hurt Me: Costly (But Quiet) Exit in Dictator Games, 100 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 193, 195 (2006).
59. Cain, supra note 47, at 840; see also Chen-Bo Zhong, Katie A. Liljenguist &
Daylian M Cain, Moral Self-Regulation: Licensing and Compensation in Psychological
Perspectives on Ethical Behavior and Decision-Making, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR AND DECISION MAKING (David De Cremer ed., 2009) (asserting that
advisers are more likely to provide candid advice in the presence of disclosure).
60. See Francis J. Facciolo, The Revolution in Investment Adviser Regulation, 18
INVESTMENT LAWYER 21 (Oct. 2011) (discussing reforms in Australia and the U.K. with
regard to changes in the compensation of investment advisers for their advice by retail
clients)
61. Id. at 24-25, 27-28.
62. Id. at 29.
63. AUSTL. SEC. & INVS. COMM’N (ASIC), REPORT 230, FINANCIAL LITERACY AND
BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE 99-101 tbl. A1.17 (2011) (Austl.) [hereinafter ASIC Report 230].
64. DAVID DE MEZA ET AL., FIN. SERVS. AUTH. (FSA), FINANCIAL CAPABILITY: A
BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE (2008) (U.K.), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pubs/consumer-research/crpr69.pdf.
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in “‘real’ financial settings.”65 But, based on the research done through
2010, the report concluded that “[w]hile raising people’s level of financial
knowledge forms the basis of many financial literacy initiatives around the
world, there is a growing body of research suggesting that knowledge is
only one factor when considering how to help people make positive
financial decisions.”66
The de Meza report prepared for the FSA reaches similar conclusions
to the ASIC report:
The indirect evidence from behavioural economics is that low
financial capability is more to do with psychology than with
knowledge. Institutional design and regulation are probably far
more effective than education, though crisis counselling [sic]
may be helpful. More research is needed on whether cognitive
biases can be overcome in the personal finance domain.67
It is long past time for the United States to move beyond either
fiduciary duties or disclosure when regulating investment advice to
individual investors. Fiduciary duties that can be varied by informed
consent are merely a more demanding form of disclosure. If disclosure
itself is not an effective means of protecting individual investors, then
fiduciary duties will also be ineffective, except in those situations in which
the investment adviser does not specify what those duties are in the
agreements with its clients. In other words, fiduciary duties would function
as default rules, much as the Uniform Commercial Code provides default
rules in sales. But a legally savvy investment adviser would make sure to
vary these default rules by contract.
II.

THE DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS UNDER THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS

In Capital Gains Research Bureau, the Supreme Court addressed the
duties that investment advisers owe their clients in connection with an
allegation of scalping.68 The investment adviser in Capital Gains had
published a newsletter that recommended particular stocks to 5,000
subscribers.69 Prior to recommending the stocks, the investment adviser
purchased these stocks and, once its recommendations came out and the
price of these stocks increased, the investment adviser sold them at a

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

ASIC Report 230, supra note 63, at 4.
Id. at 32.
DE MEZA ET AL., supra note 64, at 4.
S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
Id. at 183.
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profit.70 On the SEC’s motion for a preliminary injunction against these
practices, the Supreme Court held that this scalping “operate[d] as a
[section 206(2)] fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.”71 In
arriving at this holding, the Court several times made general statements
concerning the fiduciary duties owed by investment advisers to their
clients, noting that “[t]he Investment Advisers Act of 1940 . . . reflects a
congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment
advisory relationship;’”72 that “Congress recognized the investment adviser
to be . . . a fiduciary;”73 and that the IAA, “in recognition of the adviser’s
fiduciary relationship to his clients, requires his advice be disinterested.”74
As Professor Laby has argued persuasively, these statements in
Capital Gains do not unambiguously support the conclusion that the
Supreme Court held that Congress created a fiduciary duty under the IAA. 75
The Supreme Court may only have been pointing to a pre-existing state law
duty rather than construing Congress’ intent. Later courts, however,
including the Supreme Court itself, have “often cited [Capital Gains] for
the proposition that the Advisers Act imposed a federal fiduciary duty on
advisers.”76 It is now settled law that the IAA creates fiduciary duties for
investment advisers.77
Once we examine the IAA and provisions of related federal securities
acts that apply to investment advisers, two things become clear. First, these
acts collectively provide for few substantive restrictions on investment
advisers that grow out of these fiduciary duties. Second, even with respect
to the limited restrictions on investment advisers under the IAA and ICA,
the courts have not been favorably disposed to private causes of action.
In the IAA, the only obvious substantive restrictions are on certain
capital appreciation or capital gain performance fees contained in section
205(1), on assignments without the approval of the advisee contained in
70. Id.
71. Id. at 181 (internal quotations omitted).
72. Id. at 191.
73. Id. at 194.
74. Id. at 201.
75. Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1051 (2011).
76. Id. at 1053 (internal citation omitted).
77. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 16 (1979) (“As we have
previously recognized, § 206 establishes ‘federal fiduciary standards’ to govern the conduct
of investment advisers.”) (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471, n.11
(1977)). As Professor Laby details, the trail of Supreme Court precedent leads from the
general statements in Capital Gains, which do not identify the source of the fiduciary duty,
through footnote eleven in Santa Fe, which characterizes the holding in Capital Gains, to
the confident statement of Congress’ intent in Transamerica. Laby, supra note 75, at 1063–
75.
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section 205(2), and on principal sales contained in section 206(3).78
Through the administrative process, the SEC has created other substantive
restrictions, including restrictions on the fees that investment advisers may
charge,79 restrictions on certain brokerage transactions,80 and restrictions on
releases by advisees of investment adviser liability for breaches of
fiduciary duties.81
The ICA contains certain substantive restrictions on the arrangements
between investment advisers and registered investment companies. In
section 36(b), the ICA also contains the injunction that:
[t]he investment adviser of a registered investment company shall
be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of
compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature,
paid by such registered investment company or by the security
holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated
person of such investment adviser.82
Although there has been a fair amount of litigation involving section
36(b), there is not a single published case in which a plaintiff prevailed on
such a claim.83 The ICA also regulates the contract between an investment
adviser and a registered investment company as to form (it must be in
writing), methods of approval by shareholders and the board of directors of
a registered investment company, assignment by the investment adviser of
the contract, and content of the contract (to a certain extent).84 Finally, the
ICA’s prohibited transaction provisions in section 17 cover investment
advisers if they are affiliates of a registered investment company, which
78. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 §§ 205(a)(1)–(2), 206(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b5(a)(1)–(2), 80b-6(3) (2006).
79. See infra Part IV.A–C (explaining restrictions on the performance fees).
80. See infra Part IV.A–C (clarifying the implications of the IAA on investment
advisers acting as brokers).
81. See infra Part IV.A–C (describing the ways the IAA and ICA prevent investment
advisers from limiting their liability to advisees).
82. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006).
83. See, e.g., John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why
Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 117 (2010)
(noting empirical study of 36(b) cases since 2000 shows no plaintiff’s verdicts); John P.
Freeman et al., Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary Duty Test,
61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, 86 (2008) (claiming that 36(b) has never yielded a plaintiff’s verdict);
James R. Carroll & David S. Clancy, ‘Excessive Fee’ Lawsuits, NAT’L L.J., May 26, 2008,
at 12 (describing how no plaintiff has won a 36(b) verdict going back to the 1990s). It is
possible that plaintiffs have found a means of more successfully pursuing section 36(b)
actions by focusing on investment advisers that regularly use sub-advisers. See Francis J.
Facciolo, New Wave of Cases Involving Investment Adviser Fees, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 2013, at
4, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202622006908/New-Wave-ofCases-Involving-Investment-Adviser-Fees?slreturn=20141003154711.
84. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (2006).
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they normally will be by operation of the definition of “affiliate” in section
2(3)(E).85
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, in section 28(e), provides a
safe harbor from fiduciary duty claims to investment advisers who comply
with its terms. These claims are those that would arise:
solely by reason of [a person, such as an investment adviser]
having caused [an] account to pay a member of an exchange,
broker, or dealer an amount in excess of the amount of
commission for effecting a securities transaction in excess of the
amount of commission another member of an exchange, broker,
or dealer would have charged for effecting that transaction.86
Such payments are commonly called “soft dollar” transactions
because the person effecting the transaction is using commissions to pay
for something other than the execution of a securities transaction, such as
research, rather than using “hard dollars” to pay for the something else.87
Finally, there are substantive restrictions that are contained in NASD
Rules 2830 and 2420, which have been carried forward by FINRA. These
restrictions constrain the activities of broker-dealers when acting as sales
agents for registered investment companies.88 Without engaging in the
debate about what standards broker-dealers should be held to when dealing
with clients, broker-dealers certainly do provide investment advice to many
clients. Broker-dealers escape regulation under the IAA if they can meet
the “solely incidental” test set forth in section 202(a)(11)(C).89 But brokerdealer commissions and certain transactions with investment companies are
substantively regulated under Rule 2830.90 The regulation of commissions
is indirect, as a broker-dealer cannot sell shares in a registered investment
company “if the sales charges described in the prospectus [of the
investment company] are excessive.”91 The rule then defines what levels of
charges “shall be deemed excessive,” with different rules for investment

85. Id. §§ 2(3)(E), 17 (defining “affiliated person” of an investment company as “any
investment adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board thereof”).
86. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1) (2006).
87. See generally D. Bruce Johnsen, The SEC’s 2006 Soft Dollar Guidance: Law and
Economics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1545, 1553–54 (2009) (discussing typical soft dollar
arrangements).
88. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL, NASD RULES §§ 2420, 2830,
available at http://finra.complinet.com (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
89. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C)
(2006) (exempting from the definition of investment adviser any broker or dealer
performing advisory services solely incidental to its main function and who receives no
special compensation for the advice).
90. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 88, § 2830.
91. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 88, § 2830 (emphasis added).
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companies that charge asset-based sale charges and those that do not.92
In addition, Rule 2830 also regulates certain transactions between
broker-dealers and registered investment companies that might lead a
broker-dealer to favor sales of shares in one investment company over
shares in another investment company.93
All of these prohibited
transactions involve arrangements whereby an investment company would
use its portfolio transactions to reward a broker-dealer for sales of shares in
the investment company. The problem is fairly straightforward: a brokerdealer might favor sales of shares in a particular investment company
because the investment company directs its portfolio business to the
broker-dealer, thus generating commissions for the broker-dealer. The
methods of a broker-dealer’s favoring a particular investment company are
varied.94
The basis for Rule 2830 is a broker-dealer’s duty of suitability and the
conflicts of interest that these sales practices raise.95 In other words, a
broker-dealer should not be influenced in selling shares of an investment
company to a client by commissions that the broker-dealer is receiving
from the investment company for portfolio transactions. The only concern
of the broker-dealer should be whether the shares in the investment
company are suitable for the client. Having said this, the conflicts of
interest that a broker-dealer faces in these situations are the same as those
faced by an investment adviser who receives compensation from a product
provider such as an investment company.96
92. Id. “An ‘asset-based sales charge’ is a sales charge that is deducted from the net
assets of an investment company and does not include a service fee.” Id. § 2830(a)(8)(A).
In other words, FINRA is describing fees that are allowed under Rule 12b-1 plans.
Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance Distribution, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,591, 69 Fed. Reg. 54,728, 54,729 n.19 (Sept. 9, 2004); SelfRegulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Limitation of Asset-Based Sales Charges
as Imposed by Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release 30,897, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,985,
30,986 n.9 (July 13, 1992).
93. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 88, § 2830(k)(1) (stating “[n]o
member shall . . . favor . . . the sale or distribution of shares of any any particular investment
company . . . on the basis of brokerage commissions received or expected . . . .”).
94. See, e.g., John Howat & Linda Reid, Compensation Practices for Retail Sale of
Mutual Funds: The Need for Transparency and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
685, 687–91 (2007) (describing various methods fund managers use to encourage brokerdealers to favor a fund, such as directed brokerage arrangements, 28(e) soft dollar practices,
shelf-space agreements, and differential cash compensation).
95. See id.; FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 88, § 2111.
96. See James S. Wrona, The Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-Based Analysis of the Legal
Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and a Framework for Enhanced
Investor Protection, 68 BUS. LAW. 1, 46–47 (2012) (noting that investment advisers and
broker-dealers are regulated in very similar ways except for conflict disclosure and
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In examining the duties of investment advisers under the federal
securities laws, this Article focuses on the IAA. In part, this choice is
driven by the fact that the IAA is the federal statute that captures the largest
group whose business is premised on investment advice. The ICA focuses
on one subset of investment advisers, those who advise registered
investment companies.97 FINRA rules focus on broker-dealers as salesmen
for securities in investment companies.98 In this capacity, broker-dealers
can certainly render investment advice. But these broker-dealers do not
necessarily devote themselves to investment advice. If they do, then they
must become dual-registrants, registering under both the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“‘34 Act”) and the IAA.99 It is the IAA that covers
all those whose main business is investment advice.100
III.

THE DUTIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS UNDER THE
INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT

The definition of investment adviser in section 202(a)(11) is quite
broad. It works by sweeping in anyone who offers investment advice in
any form and then exempting from the definition certain groups, such as
“publisher[s] of any bona fide . . . financial publication of general and
regular circulation” and “any broker or dealer whose performance of such
[advisory] services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a
broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation” for such
advisory services.101 In addition, certain sections of the IAA apply only to
registered investment advisers. Section 203(b) exempts from registration
proposing that broker-dealers file a “Form ADV-type” of document regarding conflicts of
interest so that customers can make more informed decisions about investment advice).
97. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(20), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (2006)
(defining the term “investment adviser” as an investment adviser to an investment
company).
98. See James T. Koebel, Trust and the Investment Adviser Industry: Congress’
Failure to Realize FINRA’s Potential to Restore Investor Confidence, 35 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 61, 64–65 (2010) (describing FINRA’s role in regulating broker-dealers and
arguing that there is a gap in oversight for investment advisers).
99. See e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and
Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 403–04 (2010) (detailing the exclusion from IAA
registration for broker-dealers who provide advisory services in the context of brokerage
and noting that brokers who provide advice separate from conventional brokerage are
ineligible for the exclusion and must dual-register).
100. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-202(a)(11) (2006)
(broadly defining “investment adviser” as any person who advises others on the value of
securities).
101. Id. § 202(a)(11)(C)–(D). See generally Francis J. Facciolo, When Should a BrokerDealer Be Treated as an Investment Adviser?, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 1, 2011, at 4 (describing
recent cases on the solely-incidental issue).
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certain types of investment advisers, although this is a smaller group than it
formerly was.102
As described above in Part III, the Supreme Court has interpreted
Section 206 – and specifically subsections (1) and (2) – as creating a
fiduciary standard for investment advisers.103 Subsection (1) provides that
it is “unlawful for any investment adviser . . . to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client.”104
Subsection (2) provides that it is “unlawful for any investment adviser . . .
to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.”105 Each of these
subsections applies to both registered and unregistered investment
advisers.106
Beyond these general anti-fraud principles, there is very little in the
IAA that substantively regulates the contract between an investment
adviser and its clients that can be seen as reinforcing its fiduciary duty to its
advisees. Part IV of this Article explores these limited areas. There
certainly are additional restrictions under the IAA, and the rules and
regulations promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the IAA, on how an
investment adviser conducts its business and on how it makes disclosures
to its clients.107 But the contract between an investment adviser and its
102. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2000), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)) (making a major change in section 203(b), effective July 21, 2011,
requiring registration by many investment advisers who previously had relied on the former
exemption contained in section 203(b)(3) for an investment adviser who “had fewer than
fifteen clients and who neither holds himself out generally to the public as an investment
adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to any [registered] investment company.”); see,
e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, More Than 1,500 Private Fund Advisers
Registered with the SEC Since Passage of the Financial Reform Law (Oct. 19, 2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-214.htm [hereinafter SEC Press
Release] (demonstrating that this change made many once exempt investment advisers
subject to registration). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
also requires registration for investment advisers who act as an investment adviser to any
private fund regardless of client number or the location of clients only within a single state.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(1). Dodd-Frank also requires registration for advisers registered with
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as a commodity trading adviser but who
advise a private fund with predominately securities-related advice. Id. § 80b-3(b)(6)(B)
103. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (recognizing “federal fiduciary
standards” for investment advisers).
104. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1) (2006)
(emphasis added).
105. Id. § 206(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
106. See id. § 205(a) (“No investment adviser registered or required to be registered
with the Commission shall . . . .”) (emphasis added).
107. Beyond the areas discussed in this Article, registered investment advisers are
subject, for example, to record keeping obligations (Rule 204-2); certain disclosure
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clients is remarkably free of restrictions.
A. Compensation
The SEC has pursued substantive regulation of investment advisers in
the IAA in the area of compensation, both as to amount and type. The IAA
itself contains restrictions on performance fees,108 while the regulation of
the amount of compensation is solely a child of SEC no-action letters.109
1. Excessive Compensation
The SEC has read a restriction on excessive compensation into the
IAA through a series of no-action letters in the 1970s. The SEC continues
to cite to this restriction in public appearances110 despite the fact that there
has been no further clarification of the SEC’s position in the past forty
years. One cannot help but wonder about the “precedential” value111 of
forty-year-old no-action letters that have spawned no follow-up
jurisprudence other than public statements by SEC staff members and other

obligations to clients and prospective clients (Rule 204-3), a requirement to adopt a code of
ethics (Rule 204A-1); certain client prospective consent and investment adviser disclosures
with respect to agency cross transactions (Rule 206(3)-2); restrictions on advertising (Rule
206(4)-1); custody requirements for customer funds and securities (Rule 206(4)-2);
restrictions on cash payments for client solicitations (Rule 206(4)-3); restrictions on political
contributions by certain investment advisers (Rule 206(4)-5); requirements for proxy voting
of client securities (Rule 206(4)-6); and requirements for compliance programs (Rule
206(4)-7). Id. §§ 204, 206.
108. See infra notes 127-141 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 110-126 and accompanying text.
110. ROBERT E. PLAZE, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS
BY THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 50 n.256 (2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf.
111. “Precedential” is in quotes because, theoretically, IAA no-action letters and noaction requests do not bind even the Commission itself with respect to the particular party
that has written to the Division of Investment Management. But, as a practical matter, both
the SEC and the rest of the investment management bar treat no-action letters as precedent,
citing to earlier letters with regularity in later letters. The SEC also cites earlier letters in
releases and enforcement actions. No-action letters even get cited in court cases as evidence
of SEC policies. Finally, earlier letters are used by the private bar as guidance for advice to
clients. See, e.g., Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No–Action Letter Process, 42 BUS. LAW.
1019 (1987) (opining that, while the precedential effect of no-action responses to
nonrecipients is less weighty, they may nonetheless be used by anyone engaging in
materially similar transactions); Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory
Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 966–990 (1998) (stating that no-action letters and their
interpretations are received with automatic deference by a majority of judges but that a
minority of judges will treat no-action letters as merely advisory).
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members of the investment management bar.112
The earliest of these letters is one from Richard J. Laibinger, Jr., in
1971.113 It also is quite typical of the later letters. Mr. Laibinger wrote to
the SEC, requesting permission to charge the fees that he had listed in his
application for registration as an investment advisor.114 He proposed “to
charge advisory fees of $2,000 minimum for portfolios valued at $30,000
or less, $3,000 minimum for portfolios valued between $30,000 and
$50,000 and $4,000 minimum for portfolios valued at $50,000 or more.”115
For these fees, a client would have received “a maximum of six personal
conferences” and “any special reports” about securities produced by Mr.
Laibinger.116
In the SEC’s view, such fees were “substantially in excess of the
prevailing fees charged by other investment advisers offering comparable
services.”117 The SEC expressed skepticism that “any amount of disclosure
could adequately apprise potential clients of the excessive nature of the
fees.”118 The SEC went beyond this skepticism about disclosure, noting
that such high fees “appear to be so unconscionably high as to violate the
applicable anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.”119
Later no-action letters rephrase the relationship between the anti-fraud
provisions and disclosure as it was explained to Mr. Laibinger, but they do
continue to express skepticism that any amount of disclosure would be
effective. In addition, the later letters give an actual figure—two percent—
as to what comparable asset-based fees are,120 although the issue has been
raised whether the SEC should allow for higher fees if there are additional
services being performed other than standard investment advice.121 In light
112. Clifford E. Kirsch, Financial Planning, in CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE 245, 248–
49 (Practising Law Institute 2012) (printing a presentation given July 18, 2012 by Kirsch).
113. Richard J. Laibinger, Jr., SEC No-Action Letter, 1971 WL 7757 (Sept. 11, 1971).
114. Id. at *1
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. The SEC will recharacterize certain service charges as investment advisory fees if
such service charges are part of what is normally included within an advisory fee. See
Standard & Poor’s Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 11120, at *9 (Nov. 23, 1975)
(“[m]oreover, in determining whether management compensation is so large as to require
special disclosure, consideration must be given to the total cost to the investor, not merely
that portion of the management compensation which is labelled [sic] the advisory fee. It is
our understanding that investment advisers providing investment supervisory services do not
normally impose service charges in addition to the advisory fee.”).
121. Scheinman and Bell, SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 12226, at *2 (Feb. 1, 1976).
The Knowles & Armstrong, Inc. No-Action Letter is cited in Scheinman and Bell for the
proposition that “the SEC has, under certain circumstances, permitted an ‘extra charge’ for
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of the fact that these letters are forty years old, it is hard to know what to
make of these concerns. But these 1970s letters continue to be cited by
SEC staff members and private investment management lawyers without
any discussion of whether a line should be drawn at two percent or some
other percentage.122
The later 1970s letters start with the anti-fraud provisions of section
206 of the IAA, stating the SEC’s view “that the anitfraud [sic] provisions
in Section 206 of the Act apply to excessive advisory fees.”123 The later
1970s letters differ in how they treat disclosure. Some letters contemplate
that otherwise excessive fees might be adequately disclosed to an advisee,
thus immunizing the investment adviser from a fraud action under section
206.124 Other letters express the SEC’s view that no amount of disclosure
could be effective. This latter position seems to stem from the SEC’s view
that no reasonable investor would ever agree to pay more than what the
market rate was and, therefore, even if consent was obtained, the disclosure
must have been inadequate. As the SEC has stated its view:
However, even if you were to prepare such a disclosure
statement, we cannot give you any assurance that, in
circumstances where the fee charged was more than 2% of the
assets actually under management, we would not take the
position that the fee arrangement would violate Section 206
because it is doubtful whether a client in full possession of all the
the rendition of advice concerning options” and, therefore, a fee of greater than two percent
could be justified. Id. However, Scheinman does not stand for this proposition, as the SEC
took no position since it had been provided with only “limited facts.” Id. Knowles,
however, cannot be read for this conclusion. Knowles & Armstrong, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1974 WL 10959 (Apr. 16, 1974). The no-action applicant in Knowles did propose to
charge an option fee in addition to its basic one-percent advisory fee. Id. at *1. But the
SEC, in its response granting no-action relief, relied on the fact that these two fees would
total less than two percent. Id. at *2
122. See Kirsch, supra note 112, at 248-49 (“The SEC Staff has taken the position that
advisory fees, in total, that exceed 3.00% per year require additional disclosure essentially
informing the client that he or she could likely receive comparable services from another
adviser for a lower fee.”) (footnote omitted) (citing to 1970s no-action letters); Plaze, supra
note 110, at 50 n.256 (noting that “The [SEC] staff had indicated that it will consider an
advisory fee greater than 2% of the total assets . . . excessive and would violate section
206.”).
123. Crystal Sec. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 8418, at *2 (Sept. 10, 1973).
124. The required disclosure has two parts. First, that the fees being charged are “higher
than that normally charged in the industry,” and second, “that other advisers can provide the
same or similar services at lower rates.” Philip R. Bulliard, SEC No-Action Letter, 1974
WL 10973, at *3 (July 5, 1974). Procedurally, the SEC has recommended that disclosure
should be in writing and that “[i]t would be advisable for [the adviser] to receive from each
such advisory client a written acknowledgment of his receipt and understanding of the
matters disclosed therein.” Fin. Counseling Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 7071,
at *2 (Dec. 7, 1974).
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facts would consent to such a fee arrangement.”125
The principles of the excessive fee no-action letters have been applied
by the SEC to several other industry practices, such as directed brokerage
programs in which advisees do not receive the full benefit of the
compensation paid by brokers for the business directed to them. These
programs raise similar consent issues in the SEC’s view:
“Unless the full benefits of the adviser’s reduction in expenses
are passed through to his clients, we cannot envision at this time
any situation in which implementation of this course of business
would not result in a breach of fiduciary duty to clients or that a
client in full possession of all the facts would knowingly consent
to such arrangement.”126
2. Performance Fees
Section 205(a)(1) of the IAA, read in conjunction with section
205(b)(2), provides that certain registered investment advisers may not
enter into contracts to receive “compensation. . . on the basis of a share of
capital gains upon or capital appreciation of the funds or any portion of the
funds of [a] client.”127 However, if the client is a registered investment
company or if “the contract relates to the investment of assets in excess of
$1 million,” and if the contract with the registered investment company for
investment of assets in excess of $1 million provides for what the industry
calls a “fulcrum fee” arrangement, the restrictions of this section do not
apply.128 The congressional intent behind the prohibition on performance
125. Fin. Counseling Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 7071, at *2 (Dec 7, 1974).
This principle has also been applied by the SEC to an advisee waiving her right to the
receipt of individualized advice. See Runyon & Assocs.-Prof’l Consultants, Inc., SEC NoAction Letter, 1974 WL 10993, at *1 (Nov. 17, 1974) (stating “we have some doubt as to
whether the adviser’s fiduciary duty [to render individualized advice] would be satisfied
even if disclosure were made that no consideration will be given to other factors” besides
“‘general stock market direction.’”).
126. Donnelly, Clark, Chase & Haakh, SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 12221, at *2
(Apr. 27, 1973); accord Tex. Inv. Mgmt. Co. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 11847,
at *1 (Nov. 9, 1973) (stating that “an investment adviser has a fiduciary duty to deal fairly
with . . . his clients” and directed brokerage conflicts with this duty); see also A. S. Hasen,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 10985, at *5 (July 12, 1974) (asserting that subject to
the investment adviser’s best execution obligations, directed brokerage was allowed where
advance written notice was given of possible conflict of interest between the investment
adviser and the advisee, and no brokerage transactions beyond those that would normally
have occurred were carried out).
127. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 205(a)(1), (b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-5(a)(1),
(b)(2) (2006).
128. Id. at § 205(a)(1), (b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-5(a)(1), 80b-5(b)(2). There are a
number of other exceptions built into section 205: one for certain investment advisory
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fees was to remove the temptation for investment advisers “to take undue
risks with the funds of clients”129 encouraged by “profit-sharing contracts
which are nothing more than ‘heads I [the investment adviser] win, tails
you [the advisee] lose’ arrangements.”130 In other words, an investment
adviser could be tempted to gamble with a client’s assets in order to make a
profit because the gain for the investment adviser from the profit could be
much larger than the loss of any ongoing asset management fee.131 If the
gamble was unsuccessful, then the client would lose some or all of her
investments while, at most, the investment adviser would lose some or all
of any ongoing asset management fee.132
contracts with business development companies, one for advisory contracts with investment
companies where securities holders are all “qualified purchases” at the time of purchase, and
one for advisory contracts with a non-U.S. resident person. Id. at § 205(b)(3), (5), (e).
129. H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 29 (1940).
130. S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 22 (1940).
131. The original draft of the IAA contained a Declaration of Policy to the effect that
“the national public interest and the interest [sic] of investors are adversely affected . . .
when [, among other things,] the compensation of investment advisers is based upon profitsharing contracts and other contingent arrangements conducive to excessive speculation and
trading.” S. 3580, 76th Cong. § 202 (1940). This language disappeared from the bill that
was finally enacted, which focused on establishing that investment advisers were engaged in
interstate commerce and, thus, were subject to Congressional regulation. Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 § 201. The constitutional basis for regulating investment advisers was
explored in the Senate hearings prior to the finally-enacted bill through discussion about the
predecessor bill. See, e.g., Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. 3580, 77th Cong. 745–46 (1940)
(statement of Rudolf B. Berle, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Counsel Ass’n of Am., N.Y.C.)
(testifying that because the industry was so new at the time, it should not be regulated by
either state or federal authority).
132. The voluminous study of Investment Trusts and Investment Companies that the
SEC released in 1938 and 1939 does not discuss investment counsel, as investment advisers
were called at the time. The hearings on the proposed IAA do not provide any further
illumination on the intent behind the fulcrum fee provisions. Rather, the hearings before the
Senate focused on whether there should be any regulation of investment counsel, with
investment counsel representatives raising concerns that federal regulation would have
unintended consequences and, most importantly, that investment counsel were professionals
whose regulation “would represent the first encroachment of the Federal government into
the domain of personal, professional relationships.” Investment Trusts and Investment
Companies: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency on S.
3580, 77th Cong. 738 (1940) (statement of Dwight C. Rose, Partner of Brundage, Story &
Rise, N.Y.C., and President, Inv. Counsel Ass’n of Am.). By the time the House of
Representatives held hearings on H.R. 10065, which, with some amendments, was
eventually enacted, the representative of the investment counsel industry had met with the
SEC and resolved their objections to the IAA. Investment Trusts and Investment
Companies: Hearings before a Subcomm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R.
10065, 76th Cong. 91–93 (1940) (statement of Dwight C. Rose, Partner of Brundage, Story
& Rise, N.Y.C., and President, Inv. Counsel Ass’n of Am.). The investment counsel
representatives had succeeded in preventing incorporation into the IAA of certain provisions
from the ICA that the representatives felt would give the SEC “unnecessarily broad”
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The rationale behind the fulcrum fee concept seems clear, although the
language on how a fulcrum fee arrangement operates is anything but
clear.133 The rationale is that an investment adviser will not be tempted to
gamble with their client’s assets if the investment adviser’s fee can go
down as well as up because of such a gamble. The mechanism of a
fulcrum fee is easy to understand once one reads a typical industry
disclosure on how a performance fee works. A fulcrum fee is the fee
earned when the investment performance of a registered investment
company or other fund referenced in section 205(b)(2)(B) equals that of an
“index of securities prices or such other measure of investment
performance as the Commission by rule, regulation, or order may specify”
(the “benchmark”).134 From this “point,” i.e., this fulcrum, compensation to
the investment adviser is decreased or increased with the amount of such
decrease or increase depending on how the registered investment
company’s or other fund’s “investment performance” compares to that of
the selected benchmark.
The SEC views an incentive-based fee as consisting of two parts: a
fulcrum fee and a performance fee.135 Sometimes, the term “fulcrum fee” is
applied to the total fee to be paid to an investment advisor, with the fulcrum
powers. Id. at 92. The original bill had proposed to incorporate sections from title I of S.
3580, the predecessor to the ICA, S. 3580 § 203 (“Sections 3, 34(b), 35(b), and (c), 36, 37
(e) and (f), 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, and 47.”).
133. A fulcrum fee arrangement is one where:
the contract provides for compensation based on the asset value of the company
or fund under management averaged over a specified period and increasing and
decreasing proportionately with the investment performance of the company or
fund over a specified period in relation to the investment record of an
appropriate index of securities prices or such other measure of investment
performance as the Commission by rule, regulation, or order may specify.
Investment Advisers Act § 205(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2) (2006). Measurement of
changes in compensation is calculated as follows:
the point from which increases and decreases in compensation are measured
shall be the fee which is paid or earned when the investment performance of
such company or fund is equivalent to that of the index or other measure of
performance, and an index of securities prices shall be deemed appropriate
unless the Commission by order shall determine otherwise.
Id. at § 205(c). Finally, an “investment advisory contract” is defined as “any contract or
agreement whereby a person agrees to act as investment adviser to or to manage any
investment or trading account of another person other than an investment company
registered under title I of this Act.” Id. at § 205(d).
134. Id. at § 205 (b)(2).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-2(c) (2014) (“[T]he specified period over which the asset
value of the company or fund is averaged for purpose of computing the fulcrum fee may
differ from the period over which the asset value is averaged for computing the performance
related portion of the fee. . . .”) (emphasis added).
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fee being divided into two parts: the base fee and the performance fee.136
The performance fee is determined according to a “formula [that] has
matching maximum and minimum ranges in which the fees can be
adjusted.”137 Finally, if the company or other fund declines in value, but
the decline is less than the decline in the benchmark, then the investment
adviser will make more than the fulcrum or base fee.138 In other words, to
use a simplified example, if the company or other fund’s value were to
increase from $100 to $110 while the benchmark stays stable at $100, the
investment adviser’s fee would be increased by ten percent. In contrast, if
the company or other fund’s value fell to $90, the investment adviser’s fee
would be reduced by ten percent.
When enacted, the IAA contained no restriction on performance fees
paid by an investment company.139 In 1970, section 205 was amended to
cover performance fees paid by a registered investment company, although
the same set of amendments provided that registered investment

136. Dunham Funds defines fulcrum fees globally in the following way:
A fulcrum fee basically has two parts—the base fee and the performance fee. In
a typical fulcrum fee arrangement, the base fee is the pre-determined rate at
which the sub-adviser is paid when its net performance is in line with that of the
fund’s benchmark. The base fee is adjusted up or down by the performance fee,
which is derived by comparing net fund performance versus that of the fund’s
benchmark over a rolling twelve-month period, in accordance with predetermined rates of adjustment. In a fulcrum fee arrangement, a sub-adviser is
rewarded for out-performance or penalized for under-performance in equal
measure. Depending on a fund’s net performance versus its benchmark, the
sub-adviser will receive a fee adjustment in accordance with a formula that
equates a percentage of out- or under-performance to a percentage of fee
increases or decreases, respectively. This formula has matching maximum and
minimum ranges in which the fees can be adjusted. In addition, most fulcrum
fees employ a ‘null zone’ around the base fee, whereby very small differences
in performance versus the benchmark will not trigger a fee increase or decrease.
The basic idea of a fulcrum fee is that when fund performance is bad, the
adviser or sub-adviser should sacrifice some of its fee, and when fund
performance is good, the fee will increase while still permitting shareholders to
reap most of the profit. Under a fulcrum fee arrangement, it is possible that a
fund could pay a sub-adviser more than the Base Fee, even though the
performance of the fund is negative. This situation may occur when the
performance of the benchmark is worse than the fund’s net performance.
Dunham Funds, Statutory Prospectus 103 (Form N-1A) (June 15, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1420040/000091047212001880/dunham_497.htm.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Pub. L. No. 768, § 205, 54 Stat. 789, 852 (1940) (“As used in this section,
‘investment advisory contract’ means any contract or agreement whereby a person agrees to
act as investment adviser or to manage any investment or trading account for a person other
than an investment company.”) (emphasis added).
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companies, as well as other persons, could be charged fulcrum fees.140
Congress was concerned that, although performance fee arrangements “are
not common in the investment company industry, some do exist, and the
number of contracts appears to be increasing.”141
The limitation on performance fees is a significant restriction on
investment advisers and, unlike many of the other restrictions discussed in
this Article, the SEC has not allowed investment advisers to contractually
vary their restrictions.
B. Principal Transactions
Section 206(3) of the IAA provides that an investment adviser may
not engage in a principal transaction with a client, or act as a broker for a
third party effecting a transaction with a client, “without disclosing to such
client in writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in
which he is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to such
transaction.”142 There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate
Congress’ intent in enacting section 206(3). Originally, section 206,
including subsection (3), was only applicable to registered investment
advisers but, in 1960, the limitation to registered investment advisers was
removed; the restriction now applies to all investment advisers, registered
or not.143
140. Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 205, 84 Stat. 1413, 1432 (1970).
141. S. REP NO. 91-184, at 45 (1969); accord H.R. REP. NO. 86-2179, at 41 (1970)
(proposing an amendment to section 205 of the Investment Advisers Act that would delete
the exemption for advisory contracts with investment companies from the prohibition
against contracts that provide for performance fee arrangements).
142. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 206(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2006). The
Senate version of the IAA provided more flexibility to investment advisers with respect to
principal transactions than the House version that was subsequently enacted. Although it
required that investment advisers who made principal sales be members of the NASD, the
Senate version did not require consent from the client and provided that disclosure of the
investment adviser’s role in the transaction could be given “at or before completion of the
sale” rather than “before the completion of such transaction.” S. 3580, 76th Cong. § 206(4)
(1940).
143. Pub. L. No. 86-750, § 8, 74 Stat. 885, 887 (1960). The Senate report on the
amendments provides the following explanation for the extension of section 206 to all
investment advisers, registered or not: “[s]ection 8 of the bill would amend the introductory
paragraph of section 206 of the act so as to make the antifraud provisions applicable to all
investment advisers whether or not registered. Section 203(b) of the act exempts from
registration certain investment advisers, primarily those whose business is wholly intrastate
or whose only clients are investment and insurance companies, or those who have fewer
than 15 clients and do not hold themselves out generally to the public as investment
advisers. While it is reasonable to exempt this group from registration, the reasons for
exemption from registration do not, in the view of the committee, support a corresponding
exemption from prohibitions against fraud. Moreover, under the present wording of the

FACCIOLO_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

128

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

1/15/2015 5:21 PM

[Vol. 17:1

At first blush, section 206(3) would appear to provide an investment
adviser with substantial flexibility as to such transactions. For example, on
its face, the language of section 206(3) would be consistent with a client
giving blanket permission for future principal transactions. Since 1945,
however, the SEC has interpreted Section 206(3) so as to make it very
restrictive in practice.
Since 1945, the SEC’s position has been that section 206(3) requires
“that the disclosure of the capacity in which the investment adviser is
acting be given in writing and the client’s consent obtained before the
completion of the transaction.”144 In addition, “the requirements of written
disclosure and of consent contained in this clause must be satisfied before
the completion of each separate transaction.”145 The requirement of
transaction-by-transaction consent would be particularly burdensome to an
investment adviser who was also a broker-dealer and, therefore, regularly
engaged in principal transactions.
In the current debate over whether a unified fiduciary duty standard
should be adopted for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, the
possibility of the restrictions of section 206(3) being applied to brokers and
dealers has aroused intense opposition from the broker-dealer community.
The clearest evidence of this opposition are the comment letters that the
leading American trade organization for broker-dealers, the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), has submitted to
the SEC in connection with the SEC’s consideration of a unified standard.
From its very first comment letter in 2010 until its most recent comment
letter in 2013,146 SIFMA has consistently opposed imposition of any
statute, an investment adviser not exempt from registration may escape liability for fraud
simply by neglecting to register, so that the Commission can only proceed against him for
having failed to register.” S. REP. NO. 86-1760, at 7 (1960). The House report summarized
the reasons behind the change as follows: “[t]his section is now applicable only to registered
investment advisers. Fraud is no less vicious because it is perpetrated by an unregistered
investment adviser. Just as the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
are applicable to brokers and dealers irrespective of registration, so should the antifraud
provisions of this act be applicable to all investment advisers. H.R. REP. NO. 86-2179, at 7
(1960).
144. Opinion of Director of Trading and Exchange Division, relating to section 206 of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and
section 10(b) and 15(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 40, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,997, 10,997 (proposed Feb. 5, 1945) (emphasis in original).
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts Ass’n (SIFMA), Comment Letter to the SEC on Data
Relating to the Duties of Brokers, Dealers and Investment Advisers 13–14 (July 5, 2013),
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589944317 [hereinafter 2013 SIFMA Letter];
SIFMA, Comment Letter to the SEC on the Framework for Rulemaking under the Fiduciary
Duty Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act 2 (May 4, 2012), http://www.sifma.org/issues/
item.aspx?id=8589938634; SIFMA, Comment Letter to the SEC on a Proposed Framework
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restriction on brokers and dealers with respect to principal transactions that
might arise from any unified fiduciary standard.
SIFMA has been concerned that applying the principal trading
restriction to broker-dealers would prevent broker-dealers from
“provid[ing] liquidity and best execution to retail customers” in the equity
and fixed income markets, restrict “retail customers’ . . . access to”
underwritten public offerings, and present obstacles to a broker-dealer’s
offering “[a]ffiliated products such as affiliated mutual funds, structured
products, private equity, and other alternative investments, [that] may
represent a firm’s best intellectual capital and are important investment
options for retail customers.”147 The solution that SIFMA has suggested is
“simple and clear disclosure and client consent to material conflicts of
interest.”148 This is exactly the solution that the SEC rejected in
formulating its approach to principal transactions under section 206(3) of
the IAA.
SIFMA relied in part on the fact that the Dodd-Frank Act’s provision
that any new fiduciary duty standard for broker-dealers was to be “no less
stringent than the standard applicable to investment advisers under sections
206(1) and (2) of” the IAA,149 leaving out the specific restrictions contained
in section 206(3).150 In separating section 206(1) and (2) from section
206(3), SIFMA is following the reasoning of the 1945 opinion from the
SEC’s Director of its Trading and Exchange Division. Although the
version of section 206 in effect in 1945 applied only to registered
investment advisers, the opinion read sections 206(1) and 206(2), as well as
the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as requiring any investment adviser to obtain
consent to any principal transaction after full disclosure by the investment
adviser to the client. But written disclosure prior to such transactions was
required only of registered investment advisers.151
One has to wonder how long it will take for this disclosure and
for Rulemaking Under Section 913 (Fiduciary Duty) of the Dodd-Frank Act 23 (July 14,
2011), http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589934675; SIFMA, Comment Letter to
the SEC on Obligations of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers 10–11 (Aug. 30,
2010), http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=22263 [hereinafter 2010 SIFMA Letter].
147. 2010 SIFMA Letter, supra note 146, at 10.
148. Id. at 11.
149. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. § 913(g) (2010).
150. 2013 SIFMA Letter, supra note 146, at 13 (“Importantly, in omitting any reference
to Section 206(3) of the Advisers Act in Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress
intended to preserve for BDs the ability to engage in principal transactions under the
uniform fiduciary standard of conduct.”).
151. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (expressing the opinion of an SEC
director regarding required consents for an investment adviser).
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consent approach to seep into the SEC’s approach to section 206(3). Some
signs of the SEC’s flexibility with respect to the proper approach to
principal transactions is found in Rule 202(a)(11)-1, which “provided,
among other things, that fee-based brokerage accounts were not advisory
accounts and were thus not subject to the Advisers Act.”152 In response to
the D.C. Circuit case that vacated this exemptive rule,153 the SEC adopted a
temporary rule to help entities dually-registered as broker-dealers and
investment advisers to comply with section 206(3). Subject to a number of
conditions, the temporary rule allows for prospective client consent to
principal transactions and for oral client consent to any particular
transaction.154
C. Limitations of Investment Adviser Liability
The IAA and ICA prevent an investment adviser from contractually
limiting liability to its advisees through three routes: statutory anti-waiver
provisions,155 expansive SEC interpretations of the anti-fraud provisions of
the IAA to cover hedge clauses,156 and limitations on indemnification by
registered investment companies of their investment advisers.157
152. Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2653, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,022, 55,022 (Sept. 28, 2007).
153. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. S.E.C., 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
154. 72 Fed. Reg. 55, 022, 55,027–028. The temporary rule has been extended a
number of times, most recently through December 31, 2014. Temporary Rule Regarding
Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3522,
77 Fed. Reg. 76,854 (Dec. 31, 2012).
155. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 215(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(a); Investment
Company Act of 1940 § 47(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(a) (2006). Both sections provide that
“[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any
provision of this subchapter or with any rule, regulation, or order thereunder shall be void.”
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-46(a), 80(b)-15(a). Similar provisions are found in the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. §
77n (2006) (“Any condition, stipulation of provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and
regulations of the Commission shall be void.”); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2006) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to
waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder,
or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.”).
156. See, e.g., Heitman Capital Mgmt., LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 789073,
at *4 (Feb. 12, 2007) (stating that the SEC refuses to issue further no-action assurances
regarding hedge clauses).
157. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 17(i), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(i) (2006). Section
17(i) also applies to a “principal underwriter.” Id. (“[N]o contract . . . [for an] investment
adviser of, or principal underwriter for, a registered investment company shall . . . protect
such person against any liability to such company or its security holders . . . by reason of
willful malfeasance, bad faith, or gross negligence . . . .”). A similar provision, section
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1. Statutory Anti-Waiver Provisions and Limitations on
Indemnification
Statutory anti-waiver provisions prevent an advisee of an investment
adviser from waiving compliance of the investment adviser with its
obligations under the IAA and the ICA. In addition, under the ICA, an
investment adviser to a registered investment company may not be
protected against any liability arising from anything other than “ordinary
negligence, mere mismanagement or vicarious fault.”158 This prohibition
normally arises in connection with indemnification provisions entered into
by a registered investment company in favor of its investment adviser. In
the SEC’s view, an indemnification provision that “is not prohibited by
section 17(h) or (i) might nevertheless bne [sic] invalid as contravening
some other provision of the federal securities laws, such as section 47(a) of
the [Investment Company] Act.”159 In other words, section 47(a) may
capture a wider range of prohibited conduct than does section 17(i).
Section 17(i) has developed a fair amount of SEC gloss, with the SEC

17(h), applies to officers and directors of an investment company. Id. § 17(h) (“[N]either
the charter, certificate of incorporation . . . nor the by-laws of any registered investment
company . . . shall . . . protect any director or officer of such company against any liability
to the company or to its security holders . . . by reason of willful malfeasance, bad faith,
gross negligence, or reckless disregard of the duties involved in the conduct of his office.”).
158. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff’d, 294 F.2d 415 (2d
Cir. 1961).
159. Indemnification by Investment Companies, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,423, 62,423 n.4 (Sept.
4, 1980) (suggesting that a provision not prohibited by section 17(h) or (i) may still be
voided by 47(a)). There does not appear to be any further authority on this point. The
closest are two appellate briefs in Sletten v. The Navellier Series Fund, which involved an
indemnity claim by a trustee arising out of a lawsuit alleging breach of fiduciary duty and
waste under Delaware law and the ICA. The initial lawsuit was brought by one of the
interested trustees and some shareholders of the Navellier Series Fund of which Sletten was
one of three independent trustees. Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2001).
Sletten brought a separate action to enforce his indemnity rights, which the fund resisted on
the grounds that Sletten had already been paid his expenses by the fund’s insurer and his
own homeowner’s insurer. Id. at 933. The district court held that the fund should receive
no offset for the payments made by Sletten’s homeowner’s insurer but should receive an
offset for expenses paid by its insurer. Sletten v. The Navellier Series Fund, 276 F. Supp.
2d 1067, 1075 (D. Nev. 2003). Cross-appeals to the Ninth Circuit followed. 172 Fed.
Appx. 196 (9th Cir. 2006). During the cross-appeals, Sletten relied upon section 17(h) to
support this claim for indemnification of all of his costs. Relying on sections 1(b)(1),
1(b)(8), 47(a) and 47(b) of the ICA, The Navellier Series Fund argued that paying all of his
costs “would violate the purpose and policy of protecting investor interests and acting for
the interests of investors.” Appellants’ Opening Brief (First Brief on Cross-Appeal) at 38,
Sletten v. Navellier Series Fund, 172 Fed. Appx. 196 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 03-16475).
However, neither the district court opinion nor the Ninth Circuit’s opinion discussed this
particular argument.
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having firm views not only on the phrasing of such indemnities,160 but also
on the “reasonable and fair means for determining whether [such]
indemnification shall be made,”161 and on how advances of “attorneys’ fees
160. The indemnity should exclude “any liability . . . arising by reason of willful
misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence, or reckless disregard of duties as described in
section 17(h) and (i).” 45 Fed. Reg. at 62,423. This language tracks the language in section
17(i), and all of the conduct excluded from indemnification is labeled by the SEC as
“disabling conduct.” Id.
161. Id.
[These] would include (1) a final decision on the merits by a court or other body
before whom the proceeding was brought that the person to be indemnified
(‘indemnitee’) was not liable by reason of disabling conduct or, (2) in the
absence of such a decision, a reasonable determination, based upon a review of
the facts, that the indemnitee was not liable by reason of disabling conduct, by
(a) the vote of a majority of a quorum of directors who are neither ‘interested
persons’ of the company as defined in section 2(a)(19) of the 1940 Act . . . nor
parties to the proceeding . . . , or (b) an independent legal counsel in a written
opinion.
Id. (footnote omitted). In appropriate circumstances, the SEC independently reviews
whether “a reasonable determination, based upon a review of the facts,” has been made. Id.;
see also Steadman Sec. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 29854, at *7 (Apr. 18,
1983) [hereinafter Steadman No-Action Letter] (stating that both “[a] majority of a quorum
of disinterested, non-party trustees of each of the three Funds involved in this matter”
adopted resolutions finding that the investment adviser had not engaged in any “disabling
conduct” and legal counsel rendered an opinion that the investment adviser “ha[d] a legal
right to indemnification, and that payment would be consistent with Section 17 of the
Act.”). Additionally, in Steadman, payment under the resolutions was conditioned upon a
court ordering such payment. Steadman No-Action Letter, supra, at *2. The district court
had denied a summary judgment motion by the investment adviser seeking indemnification
from the registered investment companies and suggested that the investment adviser seek
the SEC’s opinion on the legality of any indemnity payments. Steadman Sec. Corp. v.
Steadman Associated Fund, No. 82-2241, 1982 WL 1357, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1982). As
the investment adviser’s summary judgment motion had been dismissed without prejudice,
the implication was that the SEC’s opinion would influence the district court’s final
determination of the indemnification issue. The investment adviser, rather than the
registered investment companies, wrote to the SEC soliciting its opinion. Steadman NoAction Letter, supra, at *2. The investment adviser made its argument based on the
language of sections 17(h) and (i), the indemnity sections, and the language of the sections
that the investment adviser had violated. Id. As the violated sections did not contain the
same language that sections 17(h) and (i) use to describe the “disabling conduct,” the
investment adviser argued that conduct forbidden by these violated sections was, at best,
“parallel” or “equivalent” to “disabling conduct,” but was not covered as “disabling
conduct” because Congress had not used the same language in the indemnity and violated
sections. Id. The SEC rejected this argument, noting that “the nature and character of the
conduct and violations must be analyzed.” Id. at *8. On the basis of the administrative
proceeding, In re Steadman Security Corporation, 46 S.E.C. 896 (June 29, 1977), the
opinion of the Fifth Circuit reviewing the order arising from the proceeding, Steadman v.
S.E.C., 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979), the district court record, and the consent order that
finally terminated the administrative proceeding, the SEC had no difficulty in finding that
the facts support a “reasonable determination” that the investment adviser’s right to
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or other expenses incurred by [a registered investment company’s]. . .
investment adviser” should be handled.162
2. Hedge Clauses
The SEC’s position on hedge clauses has evolved in light of the IAA’s
anti-fraud provisions, culminating in the 2007 no-action letter of Heitman
Capital Management, LLC,163 which granted new and unexpected leeway to
advisers. In Heitman Capital, the SEC stated that it would no longer
provide no-action guidance on hedge clauses; therefore, the only avenues
for further development of the law in this area are the courts and SEC
enforcement actions.164
Although plaintiffs in a number of cases have raised hedge clauses,
there has only been one case with a published opinion that addresses the
effect hedge clauses have on a contract between an investment adviser and
its advisee. The Ninth Circuit, in the recent case of Hsu v. UBS Financial
Services, Inc.,165 allowed an investment adviser to legally disclaim its
liability—or create the perception in the mind of the advisee that the
adviser has disclaimed its liability—for the actions of an investment
manager to whom the investment adviser refers an advisee. This is a
surprising outcome because recommending an investment manager can
indemnification did not exist. Id. at *1-*2. The conduct of the investment adviser fell
within the “disabling conduct” definition because the state of mind of “the president,
chairman of the board, and sole beneficial owner” was imparted to the investment adviser,
supporting the conclusion that the investment adviser acted willfully or with scienter. Id.
at*1, *17.
162. 45 Fed. Reg. at 62,423. Advances of “attorneys’ fees or other expenses incurred by
its. . . investment adviser” are not violations of section 17(i) if the investment adviser
undertakes to repay any advance “unless it is ultimately determined that he is entitled to
indemnification.” Id. In addition, the registered investment company may not make an
advance unless it has assurance that such an undertaking will either be met or will be
unnecessary. To meet this goal, the SEC has prescribed that one of three conditions must be
met before an advance can be made:
“(1) the indemnitee shall provide a security for his undertaking, (2) the
investment company shall be insured against losses arising by reason of any
lawful advances, or (3) a majority of a quorum of the disinterested, non-party
directors of the investment company, or an independent legal counsel in a
written opinion, shall determine, based on a review of readily available facts (as
opposed to a full trial-type inquiry), that there is reason to believe that the
indemnitee ultimately will be found entitled to indemnification.”
Id.
163. Heitman Capital Mgmt., LLC, supra note 156.
164. Id. at *4.
165. 2011 WL 3443942 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011), aff’d, 507 Fed. Appx. 716 (9th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 266 (mem.) (2013).
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constitute investment advice under the IAA,166 and the disclaimer of
liability for the recommended manager’s actions is arguably inconsistent
with the recommending adviser’s broad fiduciary duties.167
The SEC has relied upon two IAA provisions in developing its
position on hedge clauses. The first is section 206, the anti-fraud
provisions, and the second is section 215, the provision voiding certain
illegal advisory contracts. Sections 206(1) and 206(2) make it unlawful for
an investment adviser “to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
any client or prospective client,” and/or “to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any
client or prospective client,” respectively.168 Section 215(a) provides that
“[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive
compliance with any provision of this subchapter or with any rule,
regulation, or order thereunder shall be void.”169

166. See S.E.C. v. Bolla, 401 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2005) aff’d in relevant part, S.E.C.
v. Wash. Inv. Network, 475 F.3d 392, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that a company’s
business of advising clients about different investment managers fell within IAA’s
definition of investment advice); see also Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to
Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment
Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, SEC Interpretive Letter,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1092, 1987 WL 112702 at *3 (Oct. 8, 1987) (“A
person providing advice to a client as to the selection or retention of an investment manager
or managers also, under certain circumstances, would be deemed to be ‘advising’ others
within the meaning of Section 202(a)(11).”); Capital Asset Program, SEC No-Action Letter,
1974 WL 10950 at *11 (Dec. 1, 1974) (“Since the placing of assets under the management
of an investment adviser would normally involve investing in securities, advising a client to
select or dismiss an investment adviser would inherently involve advising such a client as to
the advisability of investing in securities in general . . . .”); William Bye Co., SEC NoAction Letter, 1973 WL 6670 at *3 (Apr. 26, 1974) (describing the SEC’s view that a
company’s “preparing a periodic quantitative evaluative analysis of the rates of return for
investment managers it studies, would be ‘advising others . . . as to the value of securities’
and issuing ‘analyses or reports concerning securities’ within the meaning of Section
202(a)(11) of the Act.”). But see Sebastian Assocs., Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL
10853 at *3 (Aug. 7, 1975) (recommending no action based on representations that
company assisted clients in retaining “outside specialists,” including estate planning
attorneys and “reputable investment advisers or financial consultants”); Hudson Valley
Planning, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 12359 at *2 (Feb. 25, 1978) (stating that a
“Consultant” to an employee benefit plan’s clients is not required to register as an
investment adviser, where the consultant primarily drafted and analyzed data-drive
questionnaires of a client’s investment advisers, and only incidentally provided, upon a
client’s request, generalized information as to investment advisers capable of fulfilling the
client’s needs, and did not recommend a specific adviser or provide general advice about
investments.).
167. See S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963)
(addressing the duties that investment advisers owe their clients).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1)–(2).
169. Id. at § 80b-15(a).
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The SEC’s first statement on hedge clauses came in a 1951 Opinion of
the General Counsel.170 The hedge clauses addressed in the general
counsel’s opinion related to literature used by both broker-dealer and
investment advisers containing recommendations or information on
particular securities. Such publications contained statements to the effect
“that the information furnished is obtained from sources believed to be
reliable but that no assurance can be given as to its accuracy,” with
occasional added language “to the effect that no liability is assumed with
respect to such information.”171 Concerned that a hedge clause would
“create in the mind of the investor a belief that he has given up legal rights
and is foreclosed from a remedy which he might otherwise have either at
common law or under the” federal securities laws, the general counsel
opined that a hedge clause or similar provision violates section 206’s antifraud provisions (and other SEC statutes) if it “is likely to lead an investor
to believe that he has in any way waived any right of action he may
have.”172
Over time, the hedge clause language was generalized by brokerdealers and investment advisers to contracts with advisees beyond the
literature context. The added language disclaiming liability mentioned in
the general counsel’s opinion is what the SEC has focused on in a series of
no-action letters and enforcement actions. Hedge clauses remain very
common in the investment adviser industry. In the first half of 2013, hedge
clauses that triggered a finding of contractual deficiency were commonly
found in state and Canadian provincial examinations of investment
advisers.173
Until 2007, the SEC, through a series of no-action letters and
enforcement actions, took a very restrictive position on what a permissible
hedge clause was. Essentially, the SEC reasoned that the anti-fraud
provisions of the IAA contained in sections 206(1) and 206(2) were
170. Opinion of General Counsel, Relating to Use of “Hedge Clauses” by Brokers,
Dealers, Investment Advisers, and Others, SEC Interpretive Letter, 16 Fed. Reg. 3387
(proposed Apr. 10, 1951).
171. Id.
172. Id. The general counsel was concerned with hedge clauses under the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as the IAA. But, as indicated in
the main text, this Article examines hedge clauses only in the context of the IAA.
173. N. Am. Sec. Adm’s Ass’n, 2013 Coordinated Investment Adviser Exams (Oct.
2013), http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/IA-Sweep-2013-Final.pdf. One
thousand one hundred thirty investment advisers were examined (primarily between January
1, 2013, and June 30, 2013), revealing 6,482 deficiencies. Id. at 5. Of the 6,482 total
deficiencies, 791 were “Contract Deficiencies,” 9% of which (approximately 71) involved
hedge clauses. Id. at 12. From the figures it is impossible to tell whether 71 investment
advisers used improper hedge clauses or whether there were multiple agreements involving
the same investment advisers with improper hedge clauses.

FACCIOLO_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

136

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

1/15/2015 5:21 PM

[Vol. 17:1

violated any time a hedge clause attempted to limit investment adviser
liability for negligence or malfeasance by using such adjectives as “gross”
or “willful” to qualify what type of investment adviser negligence or
malfeasance might trigger liability to an advisee.174 The no-action letter
issued to Heitman Capital Management, LLC in 2007 marked a turn in the
SEC’s position and declared, for the first time, that such qualifications are
not per se violations of sections 206(1) and 206(2).175 Rather, the Heitman
Capital no–action letter announced that whether a particular hedge clause is
“mislead[ing] [as to] any particular [c]lient” can only be answered by a
“fact-intensive . . . inquiry” that focuses on an advisee’s “particular
circumstances,” the “relationship and communications between” the
investment adviser and the advisee, and “the form and content of the hedge
clause.”176
It was not until the 1970s that the SEC first began to give some
content to the 1951 opinion of its general counsel. In various no-action
letters, the SEC separately rejected attempts to disclaim investment adviser
liability for “ordinary negligence,”177 to limit such liability to “gross
negligence or willful malfeasance,”178 and to limit such liability to “acts
done in bad faith.”179 The SEC has pointed out that the use of adjectives to
qualify liability for negligence or malfeasance may violate section 206
because there may be situations where applicable law requires a greater
degree of care by a fiduciary, and that, accordingly, the agreement should
at least state that the advisor was not disclaiming liability for “violation[s]
of applicable law.”180 One way used by an investment adviser to clarify
such waivers has been to include a statement to the effect that an advisee
has not waived his rights under the federal securities law or state law. The
174. See, e.g., Auchincloss & Lawrence Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 10979, at
*2 (Feb. 8, 1974) (noting that “the use of the adjectives ‘gross’ and ‘wilful’ [sic] in the
second paragraph . . . appears to violate Section 206 of the Act . . .”).
175. Heitman Capital Mgmt., LLC, supra note 156.
176. Heitman Capital Mgmt., LLC, supra note 156, at *5.
177. Jonathan-Forbes Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 7681, at *2 (Mar. 20,
1972).
178. Auchincloss & Lawrence Inc., supra note 174 at *1 (Feb. 8, 1974) (emphasis
added); see also Omni Mgmt. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 12077, at *1 (Dec.
13, 1975) (determining it is impermissible to use “gross” to qualify negligence or
malfeasance).
179. First Nat’l Bank of Akron, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
80,441 (Feb. 27, 1976).
180. Auchincloss & Lawrence Inc. No-Action Letter, supra note 174 at *2; see also,
First Nat’l Bank of Akron No-Action Letter, supra 179 (explaining that even a clause
explicitly providing that rights under federal or state law cannot be relinquished may still be
misleading; if the hedge clause purports to limit liability to bad faith or willful misconduct, a
client who is unsophisticated in the law may not realize that he may still have a right of
action under federal or state law even where the adviser acts in good faith.).
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SEC has made clear that reference merely to the federal securities laws is
not adequate.181
Even such a non-waiver statement was not necessarily adequate in the
SEC’s view, however. As the SEC understood fiduciary law, an advisee
“may have a right of action under federal or state law even where his
adviser has acted in good faith.”182 The SEC pointed out in one no-action
letter that the combination of a non-waiver statement with a disclaimer of
an investment adviser’s liability for gross or willful conduct might lead an
“unsophisticated” advisee to believe it had no legal rights for any actions
undertaken by an investment adviser.183
The SEC has never addressed the issue of whether exculpatory clauses
other than those discussed to this point might be permissible. But the State
of Connecticut did so when it stated in a release that exculpatory provisions
relieving an investment adviser of its “liability for losses caused by
conditions and events beyond its control such as war, strikes, natural
disasters,
new
government
restrictions,
market
fluctuations,
communications disruptions, etc. . . . are acceptable since they do not
attempt to limit or misstate the adviser’s fiduciary obligations to its
181. James Inv. Research, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 12791, at *1 (Apr. 10,
1977); Omni Mgmt. No-Action Letter, supra note 178, at *1. As with all disclosure, the
SEC is also concerned that a hedge clause not be misleading because it could be read in
several different ways by an advisee. See O.T.C. Fact Sheets, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,926 (July 4, 1972) (declaring a statement in a publication providing
information about certain companies that the information “‘is believed reliable, but due to
possible typesetting errors its accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed’ is
misleading inasmuch as it implies that typesetting errors are the only possible cause of
inaccuracy or incompleteness . . . .”); James Inv. Research, Inc., supra, at *1 (suggesting
moving the statement that an advisee did not waive any of its legal rights so that it was clear
that this non-waiver also applies to a statement that the investment adviser was not liable for
any act by an agent).
182. First Nat’l Bank of Akron, supra note 179; accord Auchincloss & Lawrence Inc.,
supra note 174, at *1 (clarifying that the relationship between an investment advisor and his
client is governed by statutory law as well as common law principles that apply to fiduciary
relationships). In its response to the Auchincloss no-action request, the SEC suggested not
only deleting the adjectives “gross” and “willful” from the hedge clause, but also adding the
statement that “‘[t]he federal securities laws impose liabilities under certain circumstances
on persons who act in good faith, and therefore nothing herein shall in any way constitute a
wavier or limitation of any rights which the undersigned may have under any federal
securities laws.’” Id., at *2. Although it is puzzling why this suggested addition did not
include a reference to applicable state law, the SEC’s concern about ensuring that there is no
misunderstanding of the waiver by an advisee is clear. Shortly after the Auchinloss noaction letter, Auchincloss & Lawrence wrote to the SEC indicating that, rather than
incorporate the revisions that the SEC no-action letter suggested, it was deleting and not
replacing the subject exculpatory language from all of its existing and future proposed
advisory contracts. Auchincloss & Lawrence Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 79,762 (Apr. 5, 1974).
183. First Nat’l Bank of Akron, supra note 179.
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clients.”184 This conclusion is consistent with the reasoning behind the
SEC’s no-action letters.
In addition to the above-cited no-action letters, the SEC has instituted
three enforcement actions that penalized advisors for using hedge clauses,
among other violations, although none of these actions provides much
additional guidance on what makes a hedge clause problematic. In the two
earliest actions from 1979 and 1981, the SEC did not describe the content
of the hedge clauses or why they were objectionable.185 In 1994, the SEC
brought an enforcement action alleging, among other violations, that the
adviser’s agreements contained a paragraph purporting to limit the
adviser’s liability to “gross negligence or willful misconduct,” although the
SEC still provided no explanation of why the hedge clause was
problematic.186
There also is a well-developed body of state administrative law
adopting the SEC’s approach to limitations on hedge clauses and applying
it to state registered investment advisers.187 In part, this is a function of the
facts that many state securities laws governing investment advisers are
modeled on the IAA188 and that the anti-fraud provisions of section 206 of
the IAA are not limited to investment advisers registered with the SEC.
184. CONN. DEP’T OF BANKING, SEC. AND BUS. INVS. DIV., INVESTMENT ADVISERS
CAUTIONED
ON
USE
OF
HEDGE
CLAUSES
(May
1991),
http://www.ct.gov/dob/cwp/view.asp?a=2252&q=299222.
185. See, e.g., Olympian Fin. Servs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 659, 16
SEC Docket 801 (Jan. 16, 1979) (finding violations related to deceptive advertising, failure
to maintain required books and records, etc.); William Lee Parks, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 736, 21 SEC Docket 342 (Oct. 27, 1980) (ordering administrative proceedings
against William Lee Parks for overcharging clients, failure to refund clients, etc.).
186. Wall St. Money Mgmt. Grp., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1464, 58
SEC Docket 1953, 1956 (Jan. 30, 1995).
187. For examples of state administrative law limitations on hedge clauses, see WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 460-24A-220(19) (2014); ALASKA DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE DIVISION’S
STATE INVESTMENT ADVISOR EXAM FUNCTION, http://commerce.alaska.gov/dnn/dbs/
Securities/ComplianceforStateInvestmentAdvisers.aspx; CONN. DEP’T OF BANKING, supra
note 184; Wall St. Money Mgmt. Grp., Inc., Ill. Secs. Dep’t, 1996 WL 390495 (Feb.
21,1996); S.C. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., SECS. DIV., INVESTMENT ADVISER EXAMINATION
PROGRAM OVERVIEW, http://2hsvz0l74ah31vgcm16peuy12tz.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/examoverview.pdf; Henry C. Brock, Docket No. SD 03-0007,
Utah
Dep’t
of
Commerce
(Apr.
17,
2006),
available
at
http://www.securities.utah.gov/dockets/03000732.pdf; Jay Fishman, Maine’s Take on
Investment Adviser Hedge Clauses and Assets Under Management, JIM HAMILTON’S WORLD
OF SECS. REGULATION (Jan. 3, 2008), http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2008/01/mainestake-on-investment-adviser-hedge.html.
188. CONN. DEP’T OF BANKING, supra note 184 (“Inasmuch as there appears to be no
relevant Connecticut case law, it is appropriate to look to federal authorities since the
antifraud provisions in Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act . . . and Section 36b-5(a)
of CUSA [the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act] are largely identical.”).
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The “hedge clause” doctrine and the 1951 general counsel’s opinion
have been cited by the SEC in other areas of investment adviser regulation
where, in the SEC’s view, an advisee might be misled into believing that he
or she had no rights arising from the fiduciary duties owed by an
investment adviser to its advisees. For example, in a 1984 no-action letter,
the SEC stated that a provision in a year-to-year advisory contract
providing that the advisee could only elect to terminate the contract once a
year (on the contract’s anniversary) was fraudulent and deceptive under the
IAA. 189 The fiduciary relationship between investment adviser and advisee
was built on confidence, the SEC explained.190 If that confidence was lost,
a provision in the contract requiring the further rendering of services, even
if they were not satisfactory, “raise[d] serious questions” under the IAA’s
anti-fraud provisions.191 The SEC stated that a provision denying a client’s
right to terminate the contract was invalid because “the contract might lead
the client to believe that he is not entitled to terminate the contract when
fiduciary principles indicate that he has that right.”192
Based on the SEC’s actions, and especially the no-action letters, one
could have read the agency’s position on hedge clauses to be very
restrictive in setting limits on the contractual rights of an investment
adviser and its advisee to negotiate disclaimers of liability. But this is not
the SEC’s current position on hedge clauses, as it made clear in Heitman
Capital Management, LLC, a seminal no-action letter.193 Heitman Capital
sought guidance on a hedge clause in which an advisee indemnified
Heitman Capital and other investment advisers affiliated with Heitman
Capital. Exceptions were made, however, for “grossly negligent, reckless,
willfully improper or illegal conduct in its performance”; “actions outside
the scope of [the] Manager’s authority”; or “other material breach under”

189. Robert D. Brown Inv. Counsel, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 48400, at *2
(July 19, 1984).
190. Id. at *1.
191. Id.
192. Id. at *2. A similar sort of approach had been taken by the SEC in response to
mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts between investment advisers and advisees. In a
1986 no-action letter, the SEC indicated that such clauses might violate section 206 of the
IAA because they might “mislead clients to believe that they are barred from exercising
their rights under the Act.” McEldowney Fin. Servs., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL
67330, at *1 (Oct. 17, 1968). But the SEC has acknowledged that this position might no
longer be good law: “Those positions, however, largely predated Supreme Court decisions
upholding pre-dispute arbitration clauses under the federal securities laws, and a subsequent
federal district court opinion citing those decisions upheld the validity of a pre-dispute
arbitration clause in an advisory client agreement.” 2011 SEC Study on Investment Advisers
& Broker-Dealers, supra note 9, at 43–44. The SEC was referring to Bakas v. Ameriprise
Fin. Servs., Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1000–1001 (D. Minn. 2009).
193. Heitman Capital Mgmt., LLC, supra note 163.

FACCIOLO_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

140

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

1/15/2015 5:21 PM

[Vol. 17:1

the advisory contract.194 In addition to this hedge clause, the agreement
also contained a “non-waiver of rights” provision: “Notwithstanding the
foregoing, nothing” in the agreement was to “constitute a waiver” of any of
the client’s “legal rights under applicable U.S. federal securities laws or
any other laws whose applicability is not permitted to be contractually
waived.”195
In its letter to the SEC, Heitman Capital asserted that its clients were
primarily institutional investors such as large pension funds that were
“sophisticated persons that have the resources and experience to understand
the investment advisory agreements with the applicable Heitman Advisor,
and the bargaining power to negotiate, and in some cases even dictate, the
terms of the investment advisory agreements.”196 In addition, some
Heitman Capital investment advisers provided advice to wrap account and
certain commingled fund entities that were represented by financial
intermediaries with allegedly similar levels of sophistication and
bargaining power.197 Heitman Capital also contended that most of these
financial intermediaries had a separate responsibility to negotiate with
Heitman Capital in the best interests of their underlying clients and assist
their clients in evaluating the advisory agreement, including the hedge
clause and non-waiver disclosure.198
The SEC Division of Investment Management’s response noted
Heitman Capital’s representations, and reiterated the general principle that
“all of the surrounding facts and circumstances” must be taken into account
in determining whether an adviser’s hedge clause purporting to limit
adviser liability to acts of gross negligence or willful malfeasance violates
section 206.199 In this analysis, the SEC wrote that it would consider “[(1)]
the form and content of the particular hedge clause (e.g., its accuracy) . . .
[(2)] communications between the investment adviser and the client about
the hedge clause, and [(3)] the particular circumstances of the client.”200
Where a client was “unsophisticated” in the law, relevant factors would
include whether the hedge clause was “written in plain English,”
“individually highlighted and explained during an in-person meeting,” and
whether “enhanced disclosure was provided to explain” when a client may
still have a right of action.201 In light of these general principles and
Heitman Capital’s factual representations, the SEC’s response indicated
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *4.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
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that Heitman Capital’s use of a hedge clause and non-waiver disclosure
“would not per se violate sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the [IAA].”202 The
letter emphasized, however, that the SEC was taking no position and could
give no assurance on whether the advisory agreement was misleading (and
therefore illegal) as applied to any particular client “because of the factintensive nature of the inquiry.”203
In its no-action request, Heitman Capital relied on an interpretation of
state law, including that of New York, to the effect that agreements
relieving a party of liability for its negligence will be enforced. Although
the SEC response made no mention of this interpretation, this type of
reasoning is implicit in the SEC’s statement that a hedge clause and nonwaiver disclosure of the type used by the Heitman Capital investment
advisers are not per se violations of the IAA. In other words, in the SEC’s
view, such limitations of liability are apparently permitted if the normal
standards for modifying fiduciary duties, full disclosure and informed
consent by the beneficiary are met.204
Since the SEC indicated in Heitman Capital that it would not be
issuing further no-action or interpretive assurances under sections 206(1) or
206(2) of the IAA regarding an adviser’s use of any particular hedge
clause, the only places in which further developments can occur are SEC
enforcement actions or court cases brought either by the SEC or advisees
themselves. Since Heitman Capital, there have been no SEC enforcement
actions on the subject. One published case briefly mentions a hedge clause
issue, but was decided on other grounds.205 In addition, there are a handful
of cases in which the issue has been raised in the pleadings but have not
resulted in decisions or orders in which the issue has been discussed.206
202. Id. at *5 (emphasis in original).
203. Id.
204. See Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (“We only reaffirm
here the most basic principle that a court will not countenance the behavior of a fiduciary
who, without full disclosure and consent, enters into a financial arrangement placing his
spouse’s interests at odds with the interests of those to whom he owes a duty of undivided
loyalty.”).
205. Kleinman v. Oak Assocs., Ltd., No. 5:07CV0698, 2007 WL 2071968 (N.D. Ohio
July 16, 2007).
206. See, e.g., Bruck v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 967 F. Supp. 2d 418, 422
(D. Mass. May 23, 2013) (granting motion to compel arbitration of claims that defendants
“created ‘an unlawful and fraudulent scheme to avoid the fiduciary duties imposed upon
them by the’” IAA, allegedly in connection with an account improperly designated “nonfiduciary” by defendants); Trial Pleading at 15, Bruck v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney,
LLC, 967 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D. Mass. 2013) (No. 12-12005), 2012 WL 5424954 (Count XII)
(stating “[d]efendants falsely asserted, to avoid legal [scrutiny] that they were not subject to
the IAA because they were ‘brokers.’”); see also Gramercy Advisors, LLC v. Jones, No. 07
Civ. 2809 (LMM), 2007 WL 2729021 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2007) (deferring consideration of
plaintiff and defendants’ motions pending a ruling on jurisdiction); Reply Memorandum in
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There has been, however, one published case substantively treating hedge
clauses: Hsu v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.207
In Hsu, the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court
determination that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under IAA when he
contended that UBS had used an illegal hedge clause in its contracts with
him and other clients.208 The Hsu decisions reflect a failure by the plaintiff
to clearly connect UBS’ fiduciary obligations as an investment adviser,
which it became by recommending a list of investment managers to its
advisees, to its disclaimer of liability for the actions of the investment
managers it recommended.
The plaintiff in Hsu was an individual investor advisee who was
seeking class certification for similarly situated advisees. He had entered
into a contract to participate in UBS’ “wrap” fee program, which consisted
of investment advisory, execution, clearing and custodial services for a
single fee.209 Under the arrangement, the plaintiff was provided the
opportunity to select an investment manager for his wrap fee arrangement,
and given a list of potential investment managers for this purpose by
UBS.210 Although the parties disputed whether UBS required participants
in its wrap program to choose an investment adviser from lists created by
UBS,211 there is no doubt that UBS, as sponsor of the wrap fee program, did
Further Support of Motion to Defer Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Gramercy
Advisors, LLC v. Jones, No. 07 Civ. 2809 (LMM), 2007 WL 2729021 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13,
2007) (requesting the court to rule on whether it has jurisdiction over Gramercy before
ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment); Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to
Preliminarily Enjoin Arbitration Proceedings, Wootten v. Fisher Invs., Inc., No. 4:10-cv00598 SNLJ, 2010 WL 4062991 (E.D. Mo. July 9, 2010).
207. No. C 11-02076 WHA., 2011 WL 3443942, at *7–10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011),
aff’d, Hsu v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., 507 F. App’x 716 (9th Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S. Ct.
266 (mem.) (Oct. 2013). The district court opinion also raised statute of limitations issues
as to sections 206 and 251(a) of the IAA.
208. Hsu, No. 11–17131, 2013 WL 492443 at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2013) (concluding
that the governing law on this hedge clause issue is unclear from the pleadings in Hsu).
209. Hsu, No. C 11-02076 WHA., 2011 WL 3443942, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011).
210. Id. at *1–2.
211. Compare Appellee’s Brief at 15, Hsu, 2012 WL 729581, No. 11-17131 (“UBS
does not ‘require that all investment managers be from its approved list,’ nor does it make a
‘manager referral.’ Rather, as noted, the [Wrap Account] Agreement plainly states the
client is free to select an Investment Manager that is not on the list and that UBS expresses
no opinion about the capabilities of the listed firms.”) with Appellant’s Opening Brief at 22,
Hsu, 2013 WL 492443, No. 11-17131 (“‘Investment Advisor [the Manager] and investment
strategy must be on . . . the [MAC] Reviewed Advisor List.’”) (emphasis in original). The
plaintiff attached to his complaint what were allegedly UBS’ internal guidelines indicating
that the advisee must select someone from the UBS pre-approved list. First Amended Class
Action Complaint, Exhibit D, at 2, Hsu, 2011 WL 3443942 (“Investment Advisor and
investment strategy must be on either the MAC Researched Advisor List or the Reviewed
Advisor List.”).
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provide the plaintiff with a list of UBS approved investment managers
because the plaintiff selected Horizon Asset Management Services, LLC
(“Horizon”) as its investment manager from the list that UBS provided.212
The plaintiff’s complaint was based on UBS’ apparent disclaimer of
liability for the third-party investment manager Horizon’s actions.213
The plaintiff sought rescission of the wrap fee contracts and
“restitution [from UBS] of all fees and other consideration paid to
Defendant” by all class members.214 To show that UBS unlawfully limited
its liability, the plaintiff’s main argument compared the language
describing the wrap fee program and UBS’ obligations to advisees in
different provisions of the wrap fee contract with a disclosure brochure
describing the program.215 On the one hand, the plaintiff noted the
disclosure brochure stated that UBS was the plaintiff’s “[i]nvestment
[a]dvisor” with a “fiduciary relationship” to the plaintiff, and subject to the
legal standards of the IAA.216 On the other hand, the plaintiff pointed out
the wrap fee contract contained a hedge clause with respect to the thirdparty investment manager: UBS, the wrap fee contract stated, “may or may
not have researched” the investment manager the plaintiff selected.217 In
addition, the wrap fee contract stated that UBS:
shall not be liable for and Client agrees to hold UBS Financial
Services Inc. harmless against all losses to the Client from any
error of judgment, mistake of law, negligence, willful
misfeasance, or bad faith on the part of the Investment Manager
or any other matter within the Investment Manager’s control such
as . . . compliance with applicable law.218
The disclosure brochure contained a similar waiver of UBS’ fiduciary
obligations:
[UBS’] analysis of MAC Reviewed Managers is limited in scope
and does not provide enough information for us to express an
opinion regarding the investment capabilities of the firm. The
limited analysis is performed once and provides a broad overview
of the manager’s organizational structure and history, together
with information about their assets under management, net worth

212. Hsu, No. C 11-02076 WHA., 2011 WL 3443942, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011).
213. Id.
214. Class Action Complaint at 2, ¶ 4, Hsu, 2011 WL 1593366 (N.D.Cal. filed Apr. 27,
2011) (Trial Pleading).
215. Id. at 6–8, ¶¶ 23–31.
216. Id. at 6, ¶ 24.
217. Id. at 6, ¶ 25.
218. Id. at 7, ¶ 27.
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and regulatory record, and is not updated.219
The district court granted UBS’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, agreeing with UBS that it did not disclaim any duties owed to the
plaintiff and that it had not required the plaintiff to waive any rights under
the IAA.220 Essentially, the district court observed, the plaintiff’s argument
was that UBS stated that it was a fiduciary and that its hedge clause
disclaimed liability for conduct by Horizon, Hsu’s investment manager.
The plaintiff argued that while these two provisions may have been clear
when read in isolation, they were contradictory and misleading when read
together. The district court, however, held that the hedge clause was not
“incongruous” with the other terms of the contract, and, therefore, was not
deceptive.221 The district court explained: “[t]he contract never disclaimed
liability for UBS’s own role as an investment advisor [sic]. Rather, it
disclaimed liability for any misconduct on behalf of Horizon, Hsu’s
separate investment manager.”222
In ruling that UBS was permitted to disclaim liability for Horizon’s
misconduct under these circumstances, the district court’s ruling seemed
vulnerable to appeal. Recommendations regarding whether to select a
particular investment adviser can qualify one as an investment adviser
under the IAA. If a fiduciary recommends a particular investment adviser
who should not have been recommended, then there could be a violation of
the recommender’s fiduciary duties, and, specifically, the recommending
fiduciary’s duty of care. As an agent, the fiduciary “has a duty to the
principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally
exercised by agents in similar circumstances,” and, in evaluating whether
that standard has been met, “[s]pecial skills or knowledge possessed by
[the] agent” are to be taken into account.223 On the one hand, while
fiduciaries are generally not deemed “insurers” of a particular result or the
acts of others,224 the duty of care can impose liability for the acts of others,
provided the injurious act of the third party was foreseeable and the
imposition of liability is fair under the circumstances.225
219. Id. at 7–8, ¶ 28.
220. Hsu, 2011 WL 3443942, at *1, 7.
221. Id. at 9.
222. Id. at 9–10.
223. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (noting that fiduciaries have
“an affirmative duty of ‘utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material facts,’
as well as an affirmative obligation ‘to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading . . . .’”)
(citations omitted).
224. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 820 (N.J. 1981) (“Generally directors
are accorded broad immunity and are not insurers of corporate activities.”).
225. See, e.g., Call v. Czaplicki, No. 09-6561, 2010 WL 3724275 (D.N.J. Sept. 16,

FACCIOLO_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

DO I HAVE A BRIDGE FOR YOU

1/15/2015 5:21 PM

145

In the investment advisory context, it can be argued that the damaging
actions of another adviser recommended by the principal adviser are
foreseeable.
The principal adviser’s professional responsibilities
necessarily relate to the advisory services the third party is to provide to the
client. The disclaimer of liability by an investment adviser for the actions
of another investment manager whom the adviser recommends seems
potentially inconsistent with the investment adviser’s fiduciary obligations.
Additionally, applying the Heitman Capital principles to Hsu, if UBS had a
fiduciary duty of care with respect to its selection of recommended
investment managers, then it seems likely that the various exculpatory
statements could confuse an advisee into thinking that he or she had no
cause of action against UBS for its choosing to include specified
investment managers in its recommended list.
At the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff did not expressly argue,
and the district court did not render a ruling on, whether UBS owed a
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff in connection with the list of investment
managers UBS provided. Rather, the district court held that there was “no
contradiction” between the statements that UBS owed a fiduciary duty to
the plaintiff and the exculpatory provisions in its hedge clause.226 Implicit
in the district court’s conclusion is that UBS and the plaintiff had the
contractual power to limit UBS’ fiduciary duties to the plaintiff. The
limitation of UBS’ fiduciary duties is demonstrated by the apparent lack of
UBS’ responsibility for its list of recommended investment managers or the
actions of any such investment manager selected by one of UBS’ clients.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff did clearly argue that “the
recommendation of an investment manager to a client generally qualifies as
an advisory service and is subject to” the IAA.227 UBS countered that “Hsu
erroneously assumes that UBS engages in investment advisory services
merely by providing a list of Investment Managers to clients,” and that,
“irrespective of whether UBS’s mere provision of a list of Investment
Managers constitutes an advisory service,” its “disclaimer of liability” for
Horizon’s conduct did not contradict the other contract provisions of UBS’

2010) (motion granted in part and denied in part) (declining to rule that an insurance agent
has a duty of reasonable investigation of an attorney who insurance agent refers to a client
because, in contrast to insurance agent’s duty to procure adequate insurance, the insurance
agent does not have qualifications to understand whether a particular attorney is competent);
Call v. Czaplicki, 2011 WL 2532712 (D.N.J. June 23, 2011) (reconsideration granted in part
and denied in part).
226. Hsu, No. C 11-02076 WHA., 2011 WL 3443942, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011).
227. Appellant’s Reply Brief, Hsu v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11-17131, 2013 WL
492443 (9th Cir. filed Feb. 11, 2013), at *6; see also Appellant’s Opening Brief at 6, Hsu,
2013 WL 492443.
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fiduciary duties.228
It was UBS’ argument that ultimately prevailed, as the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In a brief, four-paragraph decision
not selected for publication, the court ruled that the plaintiff failed to satisfy
the pleading requirements of Rule 9 by stating what is false or misleading
about a statement and why it is misleading. The plaintiff, therefore, failed
to put UBS on fair notice of the claim.229
According to the Ninth Circuit, while the plaintiff asserted that UBS
deceived clients by leading them to believe that they waived certain
“‘unwaivable fiduciary duties’” through the hedge clauses, the plaintiff
“never identifies or explains what those ‘unwaivable fiduciary duties’
are . . . HSU’s claim fails because the clauses he points to do not waive
compliance with any provision of the IAA.”230 Judging by the Ninth
Circuit’s decision, it appears that despite the plaintiff’s references to the
fiduciary duty owed by UBS to the plaintiff, based on its list of
recommended investment managers in both the plaintiff’s opening and
reply briefs to the Ninth Circuit, the point was lost on the panel.
The Ninth Circuit also refused to consider the plaintiff’s argument
that, in practice, UBS allegedly required clients to use an investment
manager from the UBS pre-approved list, calling this an argument raised
for the first time on appeal.231 This is puzzling because the plaintiff, in both
his complaint and his opposition to UBS’ motion to dismiss, had cited an
internal UBS document that ostensibly required that the investment
manager be on UBS’ pre-approved list.232 It can be argued, from the
pleadings and opposition to the motion to dismiss, that UBS’ policy
requiring the plaintiff to select an adviser from the list was not central to
the plaintiff’s contention that UBS violated the anti-fraud provision (that
was the language of the hedge clauses themselves). The Ninth Circuit’s
refusal to consider the argument, however, worked a particularly harsh
result, given that the plaintiff referenced the point below, and its close
relation to the hedge clauses and fiduciary duty issues raised in the

228. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 211, at *19.
229. Hsu v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., 507 F. App’x, 716 (9th Cir. 2013)
230. Id. at 716-17.
231. Id. at 717.
232. First Amended Class Action Complaint, Exhibit D, at 2, Hsu, 2011 WL 3443942
(“Investment Advisor and investment strategy must be on either the MAC Researched
Advisor List or the Reviewed Advisor List.”); Pl’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.
to Dismiss First Am. Class Action Compl., at 2, Hsu, 2011 WL 7562118 (“Defendant’s
gloss that Plaintiff ‘had freedom to choose his Investment Manager’ . . . is inconsistent with
the FAC, which makes clear (through Defendant’s own documents) that Plaintiff’s selection
of an investment manager is wholly circumscribed by Defendant’s recommendations from a
pre-determined list of managers.”) (emphasis original).
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complaint.
On paper, the Hsu plaintiff’s case seemed solid under the principles
elucidated in Heitman Capital: the plaintiff was not an institutional
investor, and there were no facts suggesting that he was a sophisticated
person, that he had any bargaining power to negotiate with UBS over the
hedge clause, or that the hedge clause was ever explained to him by UBS or
any intermediary. But the Hsu opinions reflect the practical difficulty that
plaintiffs may have in stating claims under the IAA for deceptive practices
based on hedge clauses. In the section of its decision summarizing the
parties’ respective arguments, the district court noted, in a manner
suggesting skepticism, that the plaintiff was seeking rescission of “all of
UBS’s contracts for this particular ‘wrap’ fee program.” 233 Although the
district court never gave grounds for its skepticism, perhaps it grew out of
several facts, some of which UBS pointed out in its motion to dismiss or on
appeal: the plaintiff utilized Horizon as his investment manager for
approximately two-and-one half years in the program; the plaintiff never
exercising his apparent right to switch his investment manager at any
time;234 and the plaintiff never alleged that “he was ever actually misled”
by the hedge clause, or anything else, into believing that he was actually
unable to sue UBS for Horizon’s conduct.235
Heitman Capital clarified that disclaimers for a variety of conduct
such as mere negligence are potentially permissible if the advisee is
sufficiently sophisticated and possesses bargaining power, or is represented
by a financial intermediary with these qualities. Without regard to the
identity of the advisee or the financial intermediary, Hsu allowed a hedge
clause disclaiming an adviser’s liability for the acts of an investment
manager recommended by the investment adviser, even though that
recommendation in itself constitutes investment advice.
Further developments in this area will have to await further litigation
or SEC enforcement actions. But, as the courts have proven to be
inhospitable venues for complaints about hedge clauses, we may be waiting
for quite some time.
D. Restrictions on Assignments
Both the IAA and the ICA contain restrictions on assignments of an
investment advisory contract by an investment adviser. The IAA is more
233. Hsu, 2011 WL 3443942, at *2 (emphasis in original).
234. Defendant UBS Financial Services, Inc.’s Notice of Motion and Motion to
Dismiss; Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support Thereof at 9, No. 3:11-cv-02076WHA, 2011 WL 7562119 (N.D. Cal. filed June 3, 2011).
235. Id.
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permissive as it allows, in subsection 205(a)(2), such an assignment with
“the consent of the other party to the contract.”236 This requirement for
consent did not apply to an advisory contract with an investment company
in the original 1940 version of the IAA. 237 The 1970 amendments
preserved this exemption from the consent requirement for an assignment
of an investment advisory contract with an investment company, although
it was limited to investment advisory contracts with registered investment
companies.238
Although the legislative history provides no reason for why subsection
205(a)(2) does not address assignments of investment adviser contracts
with registered investment companies, it seems likely that this exemption in
the IAA is meant to ensure that the more restrictive assignment provisions
of the ICA cannot be evaded. In subsection 15(a)(4), the ICA provides that
any investment advisory contract with a registered investment company
must “provide[], in substance, for its automatic termination in the event of
its assignment.”239 Once an assignment has occurred, any new contract
between an investment adviser and a registered investment company must
be approved by both the shareholders of the investment company240 and the
members of the board of directors of the investment company who are
independent of the investment adviser.241
IV.

LIMITED SEC RESOURCES HAVE LED TO INADEQUATE
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS

To the extent that there are either explicit restrictions on investment
advisers under the IAA or implicit restrictions arising from their position as
fiduciaries for their advisees under the IAA, the effectiveness of these
restrictions rests on enforcement by the SEC. As described in Part V.B. of
this Article, the Supreme Court in Transamerica spoke very clearly on this
236. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(2) (2006). Subsection 205(a)(3) provides that an investment
adviser that is organized as a partnership must “notify the other party to the contract of any
change in the membership of such partnership within a reasonable time after such change.”
Id. § 80b-5(a)(3).
237. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 768, § 205, 54 Stat. 789, 852 (“As
used in this section, ‘investment advisory contract’ means any contract or agreement
whereby a person agrees to act as investment adviser or to manage any investment or
trading account for a person other than an investment company.”) (emphasis added).
238. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 25, 84 Stat.
1413, 1432–33 (1970). In 1987, section 205 was subdivided into the current structure and
the fourth sentence of section 205 became subsection 205(d). Pub. L. 100-181, § 205, 101
Stat. 1249, 1263–64 (1987).
239. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(4) (2006).
240. Id. § 80a-15(a).
241. Id. § 80a-15(c).
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issue, holding that the only private cause of action under the IAA is one for
rescission under section 215(b).242 Later cases have not attempted to find a
way around this restriction.
The SEC has historically been unable to properly regulate investment
advisers due to a lack of resources and the sheer number of investment
advisers.243 This lack of effective oversight led Congress in the DoddFrank Act to direct the SEC to prepare a report on the oversight of
investment advisers.244
This Article does not intend to take a position on the debate about the
proper means to regulate investment advisers. But it does intend to point
out that we are in the worst possible position. Currently, there is no
effective regulatory oversight and there is no effective private legal
recourse for advisees if there is a breach of an investment adviser’s
duties.245 Suggestions on how to remedy this problem have included a selfregulatory organization (“SRO”) for investment advisers, more resources
for the SEC, increased state regulation of investment advisers, and
legislation creating a private cause of action for advisees under the IAA. 246
Reading the history of these debates is a bit like reading about the Battle of
Verdun. The same set of arguments have gone over the top and been shot
down several different times over the past fifty years. The only major
suggestion that has been adopted is the regulation of smaller investment
advisers by state, rather than SEC, regulation.247 The ground is indeed
muddy and full of shell holes and dead bodies.
Concerns about the SEC’s practical ability to properly regulate
investment advisers have been raised regularly over the past fifty years. In
its 1963 Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, the SEC
advocated for a self-regulatory organization of investment advisers or, if
this was impossible, “added cost of governmental supervision should be
passed on and directly borne by those in the industry who are not members
242. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979).
243. Elisse B. Walter, Chairperson, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Study
Enhancing Investment Adviser Examinations, 1–2 (Jan. 2011), transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch011911ebw.pdf.
244. 2011 SEC Study on Investment Advisers & Broker-Dealers, supra note 9.
245. Id. at 44.
246. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), CURRENT LEVEL OF OVERSIGHT PUTS INVESTORS
AT RISK 27, GAO/GGD-90-83 Investment Advisers (1990), http://www.gao.gov/assets/
150/149341.pdf [hereinafter GAO, INVESTMENT ADVISERS].
247. See SEC & EXCH. COMM’N OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. AND ADVOCACY, INVESTOR
BULLETIN: TRANSITION OF MID-SIZED INVESTMENT ADVISERS FROM FEDERAL TO STATE
REGISTRATION 1 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/transition-of-midsized-investment-advisers.pdf (advising that state securities authorities would have primary
regulatory authority over many investment advisers that were previously subject to primary
regulation by the SEC).
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of such a [self-regulatory] body, through fees or other assessments.”248
Much of the SEC’s concern in 1963 was focused on the lack of
qualification standards for investment advisers,249 rather than on the more
current concern about compliance with general fiduciary duties and
regulatory obligations. But the general point remains that there was a
concern that investment advisers were not being properly regulated.
When Transamerica was being briefed in 1979, the SEC submitted an
amicus brief that argued in favor of private causes of action, noting that
“[t]he Commission’s examination and enforcement capabilities have not
grown proportionately” with the number of investment managers and the
assets under management.250 “In the fiscal year that ended September 30,
1977, 4,823 persons were registered with the Commission as investment
advisers.”251 In that year, the SEC “conduct[ed] only 459 inspections of
investment advisers.”252 The dissent in Transamerica relied upon these
facts to argue that “[w]hile the Act empowers the SEC to take action to
seek equitable relief to prevent offending investment advisers from
engaging in future violations, in the absence of a private right of action for
damages, victimized clients have little hope of obtaining redress for their
injuries.”253
In 1990, the GAO produced a report that concluded that, “[i]f the
oversight program [for investment advisers] is not improved, the 1940 Act
may be doing more harm than good by giving investors the illusion that
SEC-registered advisers have a ‘seal of approval.’”254 Although the GAO
identified some measures that the SEC could take without significant new
resources, such as creating a central database of information about
inspections of investment advisers, it did explicitly identify the SEC’s lack

248. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS,
H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 1, at 159 (1963).
249. Id. at 158 (“Neither the Federal Government nor any self-regulatory body exercises
any controls over the competence of these persons for the performance of their advisory
work. . . . Furthermore, the proprietors of registered investment advisers who confine their
activities to the giving of investment advice need not pass any examination at all, except in a
few States, even though they may be responsible for advising individual clients or
subscribers to their publications to engage in particular securities transactions.”).
250. Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 33, Transamerica
Mortg. Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (No. 77-1645).
251. Id. at 32.
252. Id. at 33.
253. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 34–35 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citing Brief for the SEC, supra note 250, at 32–33)
(“Moreover, the SEC candidly admits that, given the tremendous growth of the investment
advisory industry, the magnitude of the enforcement problem exceeds the Commission’s
limited examination and enforcement capabilities.”).
254. GAO, INVESTMENT ADVISERS, supra note 246, at 3.

FACCIOLO_FINAL (ARTICLE 3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

DO I HAVE A BRIDGE FOR YOU

1/15/2015 5:21 PM

151

of resources as an important problem.255 The most startling of GAO’s
discussions of the SEC’s lack of resources is the comparison between the
number of investment advisers and the total amount of assets under
management to the number of field examiners who did investment adviser
inspections.256 The GAO reported that, since 1980, “the number of
[registered investment] advisers has tripled from about 4,600 to about
14,000, and the assets they manage have increased 10-fold . . . to about
$4.6 trillion.”257 In contrast, the number of field examiners had not
changed from 1980: it continued during this period to be approximately
forty-one.258
The GAO reported that newly-registered investment advisers were, on
average, not inspected for three years after their registration and that many
investment advisers had never been inspected.259 The SEC, in its comment
letter to the GAO on the initial version of the report, stated that “the
frequency with which advisers are inspected declined steadily from about
once every 7.5 years in 1983 to once every 12.5 years in 1990 . . . .”260 The
lack of resources impacted not only inspections but also the initial
registration and amendments to registrations.261 For example, the SEC did
not have the resources to verify that the information reported by a
registering investment adviser was accurate.262 The SEC in its comment
letter reported that two to three thousand new advisers were registering
each year.263 And the GAO reported that there were over 10,000
amendments to prior registrations in fiscal year 1988.264
The GAO considered four different proposals to deal with the
inadequacy of the regulatory regime: creating an SRO; increasing funding
for the SEC, requiring that small investment advisers register within their
state; and Congress’ creating a private cause of action under the IAA. 265
The story of these proposals is a story of failure. None of these proposals,
other than state regulation, have come to fruition, although it does appear
that an SRO might be created through Congressional action.266 As state
255. Id. at 27 (“The numbers of SEC-registered investment advisers are growing faster
than the resources available to regulate them.”); id. at 28 (“Lacking adequate staff to
effectively regulate the industry . . . .”).
256. Id. at 2.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 10.
259. Id. at 19.
260. Id. at 47.
261. Id. at 4, 17, 19.
262. Id. at 16.
263. Id. at 41.
264. Id. at 18.
265. Id. at 27.
266. See Melanie Waddell, As Congress Keeps SEC Budget Flat, SRO Specter Still
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regulation of smaller investment advisers has been the preferred solution to
the problems of the SEC’s resources since 1995, it is discussed first in this
Article. A private cause of action, the subject of at least two legislative
pushes in Congress, is discussed second.
It is worth noting that the exact parameters of the current resource
problem are unclear. We do not have figures about the number of Office of
Compliance Inspections and Examinations (the “OCIE”) staff267 who are
currently devoted primarily to examining investment advisers. We do have
these figures for 1992. At the end of fiscal year 2010, there were 460 staff
members who examined both registered investment advisers and
investment companies.268 In 1992, each field inspector completed
approximately twenty-five inspections of registered investment advisers
each year.269 This rate was considerably higher than the rate in the early
1980s.270 Today, on average, an OCIE inspector completes less than three
examinations per year of investment advisers, although this figure does not
include examinations of investment companies.271 In addition, the SEC is
sensitive to the issue of examining investment advisers who have newly
registered pursuant to the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act.272 OCIE’s
goal is to examine all such newly-registered investment advisers within a

Lurks, ADVISORONE (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2012/09/24/ascongress-keeps-sec-budget-flat-sro-specter-stil (suggesting that failure to increase the SEC’s
budget might lead to the introduction of a bill calling for the creation of an SRO).
267. OCIE administers the SEC’s examination and inspection program by conducting
examinations of registered entities, including: broker-dealers, transfer agents, investment
advisers, investment companies, the national securities exchanges, clearing agencies, SROs
like the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) and the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board, and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. National Exam
Program: Offices and Program Areas, SEC.GOV (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/ocie/
Article/about.html#.VIPGUmRdXlM (“OCIE’s mission is to protect investors, ensure
market integrity and support responsible capital formation through risk-focused strategies
that: (1) improve compliance; (2) prevent fraud; (3) monitor risk; and (4) inform policy.”).
268. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER
EXAMINATIONS 11 (2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/914studyfinal.pdf
[hereinafter 2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations].
269. GAO, INVESTMENT ADVISERS, supra note 246, at 25.
270. Id. at 47 (“[T]he inspection staff increased its productivity by over 100% between
1981 and 1985 in terms of the number of inspections done annually per examiner . . . .”).
271. 2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra note 268, at 11, 14. The total
number of examiners in chart 3 is 460, while the total number of examinations of investment
advisers in chart 6 is 1,083. Id. Dividing 1,083 by 460 yields 2.35 examinations per
examiner. This calculation was suggested by David Tittsworth. To get to 25 examinations
per examiner, the 1992 figure, there would have to be only forty-three examiners devoted to
investment adviser examinations, with the rest of the 460 examiners’ time devoted to
investment companies.
272. Id. at 19.
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two-year period starting in October 2012.273
A. State Regulation of Smaller Investment Advisers
Prior to 1996, all investment advisers were subject to registration both
with the SEC and the states.274 In the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 (the “NSMIA”), Congress moved investment
advisers with less than $25 million in assets under management from SEC
to state regulation.275 Nothing had changed since the 1990 GAO report. If
anything, the SEC was spread even more thinly. Investment advisers who
had discretion over client assets were inspected about once every nine
years, while the average adviser was not inspected more than once every
twenty-two years.276
Congress was concerned that both the SEC and the state regulators
were overwhelmed with the burden of regulating more than 22,000
registered investment advisers.277 The goal was to split the burden between
the SEC and the state regulatory authorities, allowing for more effective
regulation of all investment advisers.278
In 2010, Congress once again reallocated responsibility between the
SEC and state regulators to make for more effective regulation of
investment advisers. In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress created a new
category of “mid-sized” investment advisers; those with assets under
273. Letter from Drew Bowden, SEC Deputy Dir. of OCIE, to the Senior Executives or
Principals of a Newly Registered Investment Advisor (Oct. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/letter-presence-exams.pdf.
274. See Howard M. Friedman, The Impact of NSMIA on State Regulation of BrokerDealers and Investment Advisers, 53 BUS. LAW. 511, 531 (1998) (discussing the reallocation
of registration authority under federal law).
275. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (restricting federal regulation of
investment advisers).
276. See SEC’s New Approach to Examinations of Advisers Focuses on Risk to Clients,
27 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 42, at 1704 (Oct. 27, 1995) (discussing the SEC’s
examination practices for investment advisers).
277. See S. REP. NO. 104-293, at 2 (1996) (stating that regulation by both the SEC and
states is unnecessary).
278. Id. at 2–3 (“Title I of the bill creates a clear division of labor between the states and
the federal government for supervision of investment advisers. Currently, while investment
advisers are nominally supervised by the SEC and by most states, both are overwhelmed by
the size of the task, with more than 22,000 investment advisers currently registered with the
SEC. The reality has been that while investment advisers may boast of their registration
with the SEC, the SEC has been unable to conduct active supervision of more than a
fraction of the advisers registered with the Commission. State securities commissioners
have similarly found their resources spread thin. Title I would improve supervision by
focusing SEC supervision on investment advisers most likely to be engaged in interstate
commerce and focusing state supervision on advisers whose activities are most likely to be
centered in their home state.”) (footnote omitted).
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management of $25 million or more but less than $100 million were now
regulated by the states.279 Putting aside the marvelous Rube Goldberg
drafting that led to two different provisions for state registration when one
would have done, and the incredibly scant legislative history,280 “[t]he
apparent purpose of this reallocation was to allow the SEC to focus its
examination resources on larger investment advisers.”281 In 2010, the SEC
estimated that approximately 4,100 advisers would switch from SEC to
state registration.282 In addition, the SEC estimated that 750 investment
advisers would lose their exemptions from registration under the IAA 283
because Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act provided that investment advisers
with fewer than fifteen clients were no longer exempt from registration.284
This swept in many investment advisers to hedge funds, defined in DoddFrank as “private equity fund[s].”285
279. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a) (describing the regulatory oversight of mid-sized
investment advisers).
280. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 111-517 (2010) (Conf. Rep.) (listing the provisions of
the Dodd-Frank amendments). The sole Congressional report on the Dodd-Frank Act
contains only fifteen pages devoted to a Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference, compared to 865 pages of the report devoted to reprinting the act itself. Id. at
865–880. There is no explanation for why investment advisers with assets under
management of up to $100 million should be under state regulation. There is only a onesentence description of this change with no explanation of the purpose behind the change:
“The conference report raises the assets threshold for federal regulation of investment
advisers from $30 million to $100 million.” Id. at 867. There is nothing in the
congressional record that sheds any additional light on the congressional intent behind the
new “mid-sized” investment adviser provision.
281. Davis Polk Client Memorandum, SEC Issues Final Rules Implementing DoddFrank Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, at 11 (June 29, 2011),
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/files/Publication/4c1a63de-64be-4051-a95500faeaf7fe53/Preview/PublicationAttachment/0c0cb405-27c8-451d-abaf-06c40e076bc0/
062911_Investment_Advisers_Dodd_Frank_Final_Rules.pdf.
282. 2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra note 268, at 16 n.31.
283. Id.
284. Congress did provide a new exemption for a “foreign private adviser” that meets
certain criteria, including having “fewer than 15 clients and investors in the United States in
private funds advised by the investment adviser.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30)(B) (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010). In addition, section 2(a)(30) provides that a foreign adviser is only
“private” and thus exempt if it has no domestic office, has less than $25 million in domestic
assets under management, does not hold itself out as an investment advisor, and does not
advise a registered investment company. Id. at § 80b-2(a)(30).
285. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (defining private equity
funds). By eliminating the exemption from registration for investment advisers to fewer
than 15 clients, many formally exempt investment advisers were threatened with registration
under the IAA. In response to concerns about such increased registration, Congress, in the
Dodd-Frank Act, exemped investment advisers of certain types of private funds from
registration, notably venture capital funds and private funds with less than $150 million in
assets under management in the United States, though private funds still have reporting
requirements. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act added an adviser to a “family office” as a
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In fact, more investment advisers that lost their exemption became
SEC registered and fewer mid-sized advisers switched to state regulation.286
As of October 19, 2012, 1,504 investment advisers, hedge funds, and other
private funds that were formerly exempt from registration had registered
with the SEC, and more than 2,300 mid-sized investment advisers had
switched to state regulation.287 The net effect of these changes is that the
number of SEC registered investment advisers dropped from 12,622 to
approximately 10,700.288 Meanwhile, the assets under management of SEC
registered investment advisers increased from approximately $48.73 trillion

type of entity that was not an “investment adviser,” as such term is used in the IAA. See 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (defining an investment adviser). Family
offices are largely those established by wealthy families to manage the assets of, and
provide other services to, its own family members. To be exempt as an adviser to a family
office, the investment adviser is not permitted to have any investment advisory clients other
than “family clients.”
286. See Davis Polk Client Memorandum, supra note 281, at 1 (discussing the
implications of the Dodd-Frank Amendments).
287. See SEC Press Release, supra note 102 (discussing SEC registration trends since
Dodd-Frank). An additional 293 investment advisers were identified by the SEC either as
having gone out of business or as having failed to switch to state registration. Id. (citing
Notice of Intention to Cancel Registrations of Certain Investment Advisers Pursuant to
Section 203(h) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940). More investment advisers would
have switched to state registration if the numerous New York State investment advisers
were eligible for SEC registrations. See INV. ADVISER ASS’N & NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS.,
EVOLUTION REVOLUTION 2010: A PROFILE OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISOR PROFESSION 20
(2011), available at http://www.nrs-inc.com/Global/White%20Papers/NRSEvolution
Revolution_2011_WhitePaper_Screen_final.pdf [hereinafter EVOLUTION REVOLUTION 2010]
(noting the 1,552 SEC registered investment advisers located in New York State in 2010).
The Dodd-Frank Act amended section 203A of the IAA to provide that mid-sized
investment advisers cannot register with the SEC if the adviser “is required to be registered
as an investment adviser with the securities commissioner (or any agency or office
performing like functions) of the State in which it maintains its principal office and place of
business and, if registered, would be subject to examination as an investment adviser by any
such commissioner, agency, or office.” H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 205–06. The DoddFrank Act did not define what it means to be “required to be registered” or to be “subject to
examination.” See Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950, 42,960 (June 22, 2011) (discussing the SEC’s adoption of
amendments under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940). The SEC provides guidance on
what states do not meet its requirements through a website that is referenced in Form ADV,
the registration form for both state and SEC registered investment advisers. See Form ADV
(Paper Version), at Part 1A Item 2.A.(2), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/
formadv-part1a.pdf (describing the registration process for investment advisers). New York
and Wyoming are the two states that fail to meet these requirements. Frequently Asked
Questions Regarding Mid-Sized Advisers, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
investment/midsizedadviserinfo.htm (last updated Jun. 28, 2011).
288. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DODD-FRANK ACT CHANGES TO INVESTMENT ADVISER
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS, 5 fig. 7 (2012), http://sec.gov/divisions/investment/imissues/
df-iaregistration.pdf (noting the impact of Dodd-Frank on investment adviser registration).
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to $49.50 trillion.289
It is frustrating that the legislative history is so opaque on the new
“mid-sized” investment adviser provision. But it is hard to imagine
anything motivating this provision other than Congress’ decision that
scarce SEC resources were best used to examine the larger investment
advisers rather than the smaller investment advisers.290 When the DoddFrank Act was passed, there was publicly-available evidence that the SEC,
as it had in the past, was overstretched and failed to examine investment
advisers with regularity.291 In addition, two witnesses at the 2009 Senate
hearing on Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities
289. Id.
290. See generally DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 2-9 (2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf (noting how the
financial regulatory infrastructure mighty be improved). The 2009 report prepared by the
Department of the Treasury highlights the need for many statutory changes that were
embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act. Id. There is, however, nothing in the report about
moving mid-sized investment advisers to state regulation.
291. See, e.g., INV. ADVISER ASS’N & NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., 2009 EVOLUTION
REVOLUTION — A PROFILE OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISER PROFESSION 2 (2009) (“Our
previous reports . . . have chronicled the growth in the number of investment advisor
registrations since 2001. A key question in the current regulatory reform debate is whether
the SEC’s resources are adequate to provide effective oversight of the advisory
profession.”); SEC, PUTTING INVESTORS FIRST: 2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 18–30 (2009), http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2009.pdf (discussing the
SEC’s regulatory performance). As the SEC noted,
[i]n recent years, the number of registered advisers has increased by nearly 50
percent and the assets under management by these advisers have nearly
doubled . . . . While OCIE staff has not increased proportionally, OCIE
continues to target high-risk firms and activities as resources permit. During the
past year, OCIE examined the operations, or some portion thereof, of nearly 10
percent of all registered advisers and 30 percent of all registered fund
complexes.
Id. at 18. The SEC did not meet its 2009 target for examinations of “high risk” investment
advisers. Id. at 30. Only 22 percent were examined, whereas the target had been 35
percent. Id. The SEC explained this failure by noting the OCIE had adopted “improved
risk-based processes” for identifying high risk firms, which increased the number of such
firms identified. Id. “In addition, OCIE introduced more rigorous exam procedures,
improved its surveillance techniques, and enhanced staff training.” Id. The combination of
these factors led to an increase in “the time it took to complete examinations and [a drop in]
the overall number of examinations completed.” Id. The SEC was more successful in
responding to no-action and interpretive requests and exemptive order requests from the
investment management industry. In the year ending on September 30, 2009, the Division
of Investment Management “[p]rovide[d] initial comments on . . . [100%] percent of
interpretive and no-action requests within three weeks of receipt of the letter request” and
“[p]rovide[d] initial comments on. . . [95] percent of exemptive applications within 120 days
after receipt of an application.” Id. at 44–45. Both figures considerably exceeded the
targets of 75 and 80 percent, respectively. Id. at 44.
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Markets testified in favor of some type of mid-sized investment adviser
exemption from SEC registration.292 Senator Dodd explicitly referenced
this possible exemption in one of his comments.293 It is impossible to state
with certainty whether Congress took into account evidence of this type
when considering the Dodd-Frank Act, particularly in section 203A.294
The clearest evidence of this overstretch is the report that the SEC
prepared on enhancing examinations of investment advisers pursuant to
Section 914 of the Dodd-Frank Act (the “Section 914 Report”).295 The
report does not shed direct light on the legislative purpose behind the
amendments to section 203A, as it was issued subsequent to the passage of
the Dodd-Frank Act but, it is an eloquent plea for the need for more
resources to be devoted to regulating investment advisers. As the SEC
itself concluded, “[a]s the number of registered investment advisers and the
assets managed by them have increased and the number of OCIE staff
dedicated to examining registered investment advisers has decreased over
the past six years, the number of examinations of registered investment
advisers has decreased.”296 In 2004, the typical investment adviser was
examined about once every six years.297 By 2010, this had become about
once every eleven years.298 Comparable examination period figures are not
available for fiscal year 2011, but the SEC has reported a target of eleven
percent for all types of examinations of investment advisers. The SEC
292. Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets—Part II:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 86
(2009) (statement of Fred J. Joseph, President, N. Am. Secs. Adm’rs Ass’n) (“[T]his
increase [from $25 to $100 million] will reduce the number of federally registered
investment advisors, thereby permitting the SEC to better focus its examination and
enforcement resources on the largest advisors.”); Id. at 217–18 (statement of David G.
Tittsworth, Exec. Dir. & Exec. Vice President, Inv. Advisers Ass’n) (“An increase in the
threshold would reduce the number of SEC-registered advisers and permit the SEC to focus
on the appropriate universe of advisers on a risk-adjusted basis in its examination
program.”).
293. Former Senator Christopher J. Dodd, chairman of the committee, noted, after the
Statement by Fred J. Joseph, President, North American Securities Administrators
Association, that “I think we all have some questions about various proposals and raising
from 25 to 100 million and so forth, what that involves.” Id. at 32.
294. The SEC is of the view that this was the congressional intent. “Congress twice has
responded to capacity challenges to the Commission’s investment adviser examination
program by reallocating federal and state responsibilities for the regulation of registered
investment advisers, first in 1966 with the enactment of NSMIA and next in 2010 with the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.” 2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra
note 268, at 23.
295. See id. (noting the personnel challenges presented by the expected increase in
registered investment advisers).
296. Id. at 14.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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actually examined only eight percent.299
Although the SEC will be able to devote more resources to SEC
registered investment advisers, the SEC has new examination
responsibilities under the Dodd-Frank Act and it is concerned that the
number of SEC-registered investment advisers will start to grow again, as it
did after the NSMIA.300 The SEC attempted to solve the problems
associated with insufficient resources in the Section 914 Report by
considering all of the traditional solutions: an SRO for investment
advisers, including the more limited version of having FINRA take
responsibility for examining its members that were dually registered as
investment advisers and broker-dealers in their capacity as investment
advisers, and a type of self-funding relying upon user fees to give the SEC
additional financial resources.301 The SEC did reject “periodic reallocation
of investment adviser regulatory responsibilities” to the states as a solution
because it was concerned about the resources that states could or would
devote to these responsibilities.302
The SEC’s concerns about reallocations to state registration are well
taken. Prior to the switch of mid-size investment advisers to state
regulations mandated by the Dodd–Frank Act, there was “one full-time
licensing/exam [state] staff member for approximately every 37 state–
registered [i]nvestment advisers.”303 In contrast, prior to the switch, the
SEC had approximately one SEC OCIE staff member for every 26
investment advisers.304 The differences in regulatory functions can give
299. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 59
(2011), http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2011.pdf. But it is hard to make this
argument because we do not know whether the eight percent includes repeat examinations
of particular investment advisers. The published figures also show a decline from fiscal
year 2007 to fiscal year 2009 in some examinations from 33% of high-risk investment
advisers to 22%. Id.
300. See 2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra note 268, at 25
(addressing options to consider when facing capacity constraints).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 24.
303. N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N (“NASAA”), STATE SECURITIES REGULATORS REPORT
ON REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS AND RESOURCES WITH RESPECT TO BROKER-DEALS AND
INVESTMENT ADVISERS 12 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/46062789.pdf [hereinafter NASAA Report]. The number of investment advisers per state staff
member will have increased with the state registration of mid-sized advisers. One important
qualification is that this is an average figure covering all states, (except New York) Puerto
Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. The easily available public
information does not break out this figure by jurisdiction. There is a Memorandum of
Understanding Concerning the Examination of Investment Advisers whereby a state that has
elected to participate may request the help of investment adviser examiners from other
participant states. Id. at 4.
304. See 2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra note 268, at 12 (charting
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some comfort that state regulators are not as under-resourced as they
appear. The OCIE staff examines registered investment companies as well
as SEC-registered investment advisers.305 The states examine brokerdealers and investment adviser representatives in addition to stateregistered investment advisers.306 With respect to broker-dealers, states
have relied on FINRA and the SEC as the front-line regulators, focusing
more on risk-based exams and exams of small, geographically remote
offices that might be harder to reach for the SEC’s regional offices and
FINRA.307 In addition, the states have conducted routine examinations of
the state-registered investment advisers “with much greater frequency than
the [SEC] has historically examined” SEC-registered investment
advisers.308
B. Private Causes of Action Under the IAA
In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, the Supreme Court restricted
private causes of action under the IAA to certain equitable remedies under
section 215 if a contract with an investment adviser is “void.”309
Specifically, a plaintiff can seek to rescind such a contract and “obtain
restitution of consideration paid” to the offending investment adviser.310
Although such restitution “could provide by indirection the equivalent of a
private damages remedy that we have concluded Congress did not confer,”
it “would not . . . include [any] compensation for any diminution in the
value of the rescinding party’s investment alleged to have resulted from the

the number of OCIE staff who monitor registered investment advisers and investment
companies from 2004 to 2010).
305. Id. at 5.
306. See 2011 SEC Study on Investment Advisers & Broker-Dealers, supra note 9, at 84
(summarizing state regulation of investment-advisers and broker dealers).
307. See NASAA Report, supra note 303, at 10 (discussing NASAA’s regulatory
strategy).
308. Id. at 8. Their conclusion should be taken with a bit of skepticism as it is based on
goals for reporting cycles and there is no easily available public information that compares
goals with achievements of these goals.
309. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(b) (2006) (“Every contract made in violation of any provision
of this subchapter and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of
which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in
violation of any provision of this subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder,
shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such provision,
rule, regulation, or order, shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such
contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party to such contract,
shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of
which the making or performance of such contract was in violation of any such provision.”).
310. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979).
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adviser’s action or inaction.”311
The Supreme Court has not made a similar blanket holding under the
ICA concerning private causes of action and, in fact, has recognized them
under two sections of the ICA, section 36(b)312 and section 30(h).313 In
addition, in the context of derivative actions brought by shareholders on
behalf of their investment companies, the Supreme Court has twice
assumed, without deciding, that a derivative action may be brought under
certain sections of the ICA.314 Having said all of this, the recent trend of
lower federal court decisions has been against implying private causes of
action by shareholders of investment companies where the ICA does not
expressly provide for a private cause of action. Only sections 36(b) and
30(h) provide for a private cause of action, although cases remain that
would support implying a private cause of action and have not been
explicitly overruled or limited.315
Congress has been no more receptive than the courts to a private cause
of action under the IAA or the ICA. Looking specifically at the IAA,

311. Id. at 24 n.14.
312. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010). For a discussion of section
36(b), see infra notes 312-315 and accompanying text.
313. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 20 n.10 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f) (1970))
(“Investment advisor[s] . . . shall . . . be subject to the same duties and liabilities as those
imposed by [section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] upon certain beneficial
owners, directors, and officers in respect of their transactions in certain equity securities.”).
314. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1717 n.4 (1991) (“Because the
question whether § 20(a) supports a derivative action is not jurisdictional, and because we
do not ordinarily address issues raised only by amici [such as the SEC in this case], we leave
this question for another day.” (citations omitted)); Burks v. Lasker, 90 S. Ct. 1831, 1836
(“As petitioners never disputed the existence of private, derivative causes of action under
the [ICA and IAA], and as in this Court all agree that the question has not been put in issue,
we shall assume without deciding that respondents have implied, derivative causes of action
under [sections 13(a)(3) and 36(a) of] the ICA and [section 206 of the] IAA.” (citations and
footnote omitted)).
315. Compare Northstar Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 615 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th
Cir. 2010) (holding that no private cause of action exists under ICA section 13(a)), Bellikoff
v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that no private cause of
action exists under ICA sections 34(b), 36(a) and 48(a)) and Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co.
of N.J., 283 F.3d 429, 431 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that no private cause of action exists
under ICA sections 26(f) and 27(i)), with Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 380 F.3d 133,
136 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of shareholders’ derivative action brought, in
part, under ICA section 36(a) on grounds that demand was not excused without mentioning
private cause of action issue or citing to Olmsted); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 112 (2d
Cir. 1981) (“[T]here is no reason to conclude that, by adopting [in section 36(b)] a modified
version of the SEC’s proposal to afford an express private remedy with respect to one
problem as to which the 1940 Act had proved ineffective, the 1970 Congress meant to
withdraw the implied private cause of action in other areas which had been recognized over
the previous decade by four courts of appeals . . . .”).
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starting in 1976,316 there have been a number of SEC proposals and
Congressional bills providing for some type of private cause of action
under the IAA, all of which have failed.317 There is nothing in our current
political climate that would lead one to expect Congress to now be more
receptive to creating private causes of action under either the IAA or the
ICA.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization
One solution proposed for the problems of SEC oversight of
investment advisers is a self-regulatory organization of investment
advisers. This was one of the three proposals in the report that the SEC
issued pursuant to section 914 of the Dodd-Frank Act. This is not a new
proposal. It has been a topic of discussion since at least 1963 and, over the
years, Congress has considered several bills providing the SEC with the
authority to create such a self-regulatory organization.318 The SEC’s
Section 914 Report summarizes the history: “The concept of an SRO for
investment advisers is not new. Proposals to create one or more SROs for
investment advisers have been considered by Congress, the Commission
and members of the investment advisory industry for over 45 years.”319
The recent consideration of a self-regulatory organization for
investment advisers has been quite controversial, attracting fierce
opposition from certain members of the investment adviser industry.320
Opponents have argued that such a self-regulatory organization would
suffer from a variety of defects. Among the concerns have been (1) the
possibility that a self-regulatory organization might not be subject to the

316. Kevin F. Brady & Mark Rockwell, Note, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and
the Supreme Court: Private Rights of Action Under the New Cort Test, 6 DEL. J. CORP. LAW
54, 61 (1981).
317. See id. at 62 (describing how 1976 proposed amendment was reintroduced in
1977); GAO, INVESTMENT ADVISERS, supra note 246, at 33-34 (describing 1990 bill to
amend the IAA to add a private cause of action). As one article summarized, the changes
made in the 1960s and 1970s to the IAA to cover more than a census of investment advisers,
“Congress has now had five opportunities to rectify the confusion concerning private rights
of action [under the IAA]. Congress has apparently chosen not to act on the situation.”
Brady & Rockwell, supra note 316, at 62.
318. 2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra note 268, at 29-30 n.54.
319. Id. at 29.
320. See, e.g., David G. Tittsworth, H.R. 4624: The Pitfalls of a Self-Regulatory
Organization for Investment Advisers and Why User Fees Would Better Accomplish the
Goal of Investment Adviser Accountability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 477 (2013) (critiquing a
bill mandating investment adviser membership in a SRO). Tittsworth is the Executive
Director and Executive Vice President of the Investment Adviser Association, the largest
trade organization representing investment advisers. Id. at 477 n.d1
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Administrative Procedure Act or the Freedom of Information Act;321 (2)
increased costs that investment advisers would bear because of a second
regulatory agency besides the SEC overseeing their activities;322 and (3)
increased costs that might be incurred by the SEC for overseeing such a
self-regulatory organization.323
There has been particular opposition to FINRA’s assuming of the role
of self-regulator for investment advisers.324 This opposition arises in large
part from the fact that FINRA historically is an organization of brokerdealers, which have different business models from many investment
advisers.325 In addition, opponents view FINRA as an organization that is
not accountable in any meaningful way to the public, the SEC, or its
members.326
The Cato Institute summarized one view of FINRA when it wrote, in a
recent amicus brief, that “FINRA’s extra-constitutional operation has
fostered significant policy failures including agency capture, lax regulation,
and biased arbitration. . . . The proliferation of substantial financial industry
scandals over the past decade is evidence that FINRA is, at best, a handsoff regulator and, at worst, a corrupt and self-serving company.”327
D. Increased Funding for the SEC
One can always dream. Self-funding for the SEC either of a general
kind or of a more limited kind, as in user fees charged to investment
advisers, has been proposed numerous times.328 The political likelihood of
321. Id. at 499.
322. Id. at 504.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 496–99.
325. Id. at 497 (“Broker-dealers are the ‘sell side’ of the securities industry, while
advisers are the ‘buy side.’ The potential for conflict is demonstrated by FINRA’s explicit
advocacy of extending the broker-dealer regulatory framework to advisers. Conflicts may
arise in that broker-dealers engage in arms-length transactions with investment advisers in
various capacities, including as service providers, counterparties, market makers, and
syndicators and underwriters. An association representing private fund advisers has
observed that these competing relationships ‘would present challenges to an SRO
responsible for overseeing these types of firms fairly and equitably.’” (footnotes omitted)).
326. Id. at 498–99.
327. Brief for CATO Institute and the Competitive Enterprise Institute as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 9–11, Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers,
637 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2011). Standard Investment Chartered involved an alleged
misrepresentation in the 2006 proxy statement produced in connection with the
consolidation of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. with the regulatory arm
of the New York Stock Exchange, which resulted in the formation of FINRA. 637 F.3d at
114.
328. See 2011 SEC Study on Enhancing Examinations, supra note 268, at 25–29
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any sort of self-funding being enacted is vanishingly small.
The recent controversy over the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (the “CFPB”) shows that self-funding remains deeply unpopular in
Congress.329 The CFPB receives funds by requesting monies from the selffunding Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.330 While
section 1017 of the Dodd-Frank Act caps the available funds at twelve
percent of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System, the
Federal Reserve has no discretion over transferring the requested funds.331
The CFPB also collects filing fees under the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act and may keep whatever fines it levies.332 Republican
lawmakers have decried the agency’s budgetary freedom, citing the lack of
oversight and attendant potential for abuse.333 While possessing the power
to “question” the agency, Congress will not be able to influence the
direction and initiatives of the CFPB through the typical appropriations
process.334
(describing a 1992 bill introduced in the House of Representatives providing that investment
advisers pay a user fee to fund SEC oversight and making several novel recommendations
regarding self-funding).
329. DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R425700, THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (CFPB): A LEGAL ANALYSIS (2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42572.pdf.
330. Id. at 26.
331. Id.
332. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FY 2013 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 6–7 (2013),
available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/02/budget-justification.pdf; DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1017(a)(2),
124 Stat. 1376, 1975–76 (2010); see Kevin Wack, Something to Watch: The CFPB’s Civil
Penalty Fund, NAT’L MORTG. NEWS (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com
/dailybriefing/CFPB-Civil-money-penalty-fund-1031666-1.html. (discussing concerns that
the CFPB will impose large fines in order to generate revenue and then award the money to
consumer groups that are political allies).
333. Wack, supra note 332.
334. Ronald D. Orol, Republicans: CFPB’s Funding ‘Recipe for Disaster’,
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 15, 2012), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-02-15/economy/
31062099_1_million-on-paper-clips-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-financial-crisis.
Beyond the self-funding issue, the lack of checks-and-balances with respect to the CFPB has
been controversial. The CFPB is led by a sole director, rather than a board of
commissioners. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §
1011(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1924. In addition, the director serves a five-year term and can be
removed by the President only for cause. Id. § 1011(b)(2). Further, the only available
appeal of a CFPB regulation is to the Financial Services Oversight Committee, which can
only overturn a regulation that endangers the “safety and soundness of the United States
banking system . . . .” Id. §§ 1023(a), 1011(a). However, judicial review is available for
parties subject to CFPB administrative enforcement actions by appealing to either the court
of appeals “for the circuit in which the principal office of the covered person is located,” or
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, requesting that the court “modify,
terminate, or set aside” the decision of the Bureau on the grounds provided for in the
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As financial service firms are such an important fund raising source
for Congress, it is particularly unlikely that their regulatory preferences will
be ignored.335 The regulatory preferences of financial services firms are not
always for less regulation. In fact, the history of the ICA is a good example
of an industry seeking more regulation in order to signal to the world that
past misdeeds are behind it and that, in the future, it would operate in the
interests of its customers.336 But, regardless of financial services firms’
preferences as to any particular regulatory regime, one can be sure that they
do not want their regulators to be immune from political influence.
This Article does not take a position on whether self-funding is good
public policy. Rather, it argues the more limited point that it will never
occur.
CONCLUSION
As we think about investment adviser regulation, we should focus on
the practices that we want to regulate rather than using disclosure as our
primary tool. We then should focus on the mechanisms by which these
Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at § 1053(b)(4), 124 Stat. at 2026–27.
335. In 2010, individuals employed in finance, insurance and real estate (so-called
FIRE) industries donated a total of $178.2 million to political campaigns, parties, and
independent expenditure groups. Lee Drutman, On FIRE: How the Finance, Insurance and
Real Estate Sector Drove the Growth of the Political One Percent of the One Percent,
SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (Jan. 26, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/
taxonomy/term/one-percent. In addition, through the second quarter of 2012, federal
candidates received over 15% of their total contributions from FIRE industries, which was
the largest contribution made by any industry. Lee Drutman, Federal Candidates Depend on
Financial Sector More Than Any Other for Campaign Money, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Sept. 20,
2012, 4:05 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/09/20/fire-giving/. In contrast,
the next largest contributor was the health sector with only 8.9%. Id. Finally, the lobbying
expenditure for the FIRE industries is closing in around $500 million per year and has been
steadily rising, ranking its lobbying budget in third place. Ctr. for Responsive Politics,
Influence & Lobbying: Finance, Insurance & Real Estate, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indus.php?id=F&year= (last updated Jan. 28, 2013). The
top two sectors, Health and Miscellaneous Business, are also around the $500 million mark,
but there is a $100 million drop-off compared to the next largest industry, Energy. Ctr. for
Responsive Politics, Influence & Lobbying: Ranked Sectors, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=2011&indexType=c (last visited Feb.
4, 2013).
336. See John Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of Investment Fund
Regulation, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 341, 398 (2012) (“The Investment Company Act of 1940
and its related tax and regulatory statutes were not simply forced upon the fund industry—
they were also crafted or at least accepted by the industry for reasons that were largely
internal to the industry itself. These reasons vary from simple apathy, to collective brandbuilding, to pure rent-seeking. But we cannot understand modern fund regulation or its
quirks and contours without understanding how the fund industry itself shaped its own
regulatory regime.”).
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practices should be regulated. Obviously the two are interrelated. Without
an effective regulatory process, it does not matter what is regulated. And,
without the proper subject being regulated, it does not matter how wellstructured the regulatory process is. But what is regulated may relieve
some of the pressure on how it is regulated. A ban on certain compensation
practices for advisers to retail clients, as has been done in Australia and the
U.K., is easier to police than a partial ban on conflicted practices combined
with disclosure. The perfect example of this is soft dollar commissions
under section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. Instead of just banning
this practice, Congress has created a situation where the SEC has engaged
in a process of drawing fine distinctions that can make no one, except a
lawyer, happy.
We should be skeptical about whether pushing the regulation of
smaller investment advisers onto the States is an effective means of dealing
with the resource problems of the SEC. As this Article has discussed,
nothing in the history of state regulation suggests that it has been a
particularly effective substitute for SEC regulation. And, going forward,
there is nothing to suggest that the financially-challenged state
governments of today will devote any additional resources to this issue.
We also should be skeptical about whether any of the procedural fixes
discussed in this Article will be adopted. Certainly, significantly increased
funding for the SEC, much less self-funding, is a politically dead issue.
Although creating a private cause of action for advisees under the IAA
might help bridge the SEC’s lack of resources, it too is probably a
politically dead issue. Nothing that Congress or the Supreme Court has
done over the past twenty years has demonstrated any receptiveness to
private causes of action to enforce the federal securities laws.
The one procedural change that has a realistic chance of succeeding is
the creation of an SRO for investment advisers. While an SRO might have
the resources to more closely regulate investment advisers, it will be
hampered in its effectiveness if regulation continues to be focused on
disclosure rather than substantive regulation of conflicts.
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